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6.1.1  Introduction 
The purpose of  this essay is to provide some quantitative historical back- 
ground to the question of what role direct investment plays in the broader story 
of  international capital  flows. The  essay  examines  whether  that  role  has 
changed over time, or changed for some groups of investing or receiving coun- 
tries, and how that role differs among countries and types of countries. 
International flows of  capital perform a variety of  functions in the world 
economy. For example, they permit levels of domestic investment in a country 
to exceed the country’s level of saving. That has been the case for the United 
States for the past fifteen years and for most of the past twenty-five years. For 
rapidly growing economies, such as the United States and Argentina in the nine- 
teenth century, inflows of foreign investment permit faster growth, or growth 
with less sacrifice of  current consumption, than could otherwise take place. 
For countries generating large amounts of saving, international capital flows 
provide a means to invest where returns are higher than at home, as was the 
case for Great Britain in the nineteenth century and for Japan more recently. 
These are long-term uses of what are, in some cases, prolonged periods of 
capital flow into or out of particular countries. Shorter periods of capital flow 
may serve some different functions, such as smoothing various types of cycli- 
cal or other economic fluctuations. For example, Edelstein (1982) has sug- 
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gested that while inward capital flows to the United States during the nine- 
teenth century were not large relative to domestic capital formation over long 
periods, they were much more important in shorter periods when capital for- 
mation  spurted far ahead of  more  slowly growing  saving levels, financing 
booms in capital formation that might otherwise have been strangled by rising 
interest rates. Countries heavily  dependent on particular crops need capital 
flows to finance periods when crops fail or when crop prices fall drastically, 
permitting consumption, and perhaps capital formation, to be at least partially 
sheltered. International capital flows can also help to finance periods of war or 
of reparations, sometimes resulting from defeats in wars. 
When these uses of  international capital movements are studied, the flows 
of capital are usually measured net, as the difference between outflows and in- 
flows, rather than by examining outflows and inflows separately. That is partly 
out of  necessity, for lack of  gross flow data. Most international capital flows 
during the nineteenth century are approximated by  estimates of the net balance 
on current transactions, where it can be estimated, or even by the merchandise 
trade balance, where it cannot. One exception to this rule is that there have been 
many  studies of flotations of foreign securities during the nineteenth century, 
particularly in the British capital market. Some of the components of the bal- 
ance on capital account are, even now,  usually observed in the form of  net 
outflows or inflows; the simultaneous, or almost simultaneous, purchases and 
sales of  different types of  equity, of  government securities, of private bonds, 
and of short-term debt are not observable for many countries. 
Flows of direct investment capital are an exception to this netting out of out- 
ward and inward flows; for many  countries, data are available separately for 
outward and inward flows. Outward flows are measured as the flows involving 
firms based in the reporting country, although these firms can, at times, repatri- 
ate their foreign investment, producing negative outward flows. Inward flows 
represent the activity in the country of firms based in other countries. The divi- 
sion reported now by  the International Monetary Fund (IMF), following this 
practice, is between “investment abroad” and “investment in” a country. 
A possible way to explain the different treatment of direct investment, aside 
from the problems of collecting data, is that direct and portfolio investment 
are related differently to the financial markets in home and host countries. In 
the markets for bank loans, government securities, and private company bonds 
and equity, many buyers and sellers are competing with each other to supply 
and acquire fairly standardized types of assets with fairly well defined prices 
in identifiable markets. Changes in flows can presumably be associated with 
changes in  various interest rates in markets for these types of  securities. It 
may matter little in the French and U.K. corporate bond markets whether, for 
example, the U.K. demand for French corporate bonds and the French demand 
for U.K. corporate bonds both increase equally at the expense of demands for 
each country’s own bonds, or both decrease equally in favor of their own coun- 
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Direct investment flows, on the other hand, do not enter any general financial 
market. They are internal to each firm, and an inflow is not simply offset by an 
outflow. Each flow brings something different to a country because it is at- 
tached to a specific firm. Equal direct investments from France to Germany and 
Germany to France do not simply cancel each other out; there has been an addi- 
tion to the stock of  French skills producing in Germany and an addition to 
German skills producing in France. Thus a comparison of net direct investment 
flows with aggregate net international investment misses much of the signifi- 
cance of direct investment. 
This contrast should not be drawn too sharply. Portfolio investment may also 
flow in two directions at any given time. Investors in country 1 make portfolio 
investments in country 2 while investors in country 2 are making such invest- 
ments in country 1. They may be seeking country or industry diversification in 
their portfolios even if their preferences and attitudes toward risk are the same. 
If they are not the same, investors in one country may be indulging a greater 
appetite for political risk or industry instability combined with higher returns. 
The flow of direct investment is very much a two-way street among the top 
investing countries, even though direct investment is more concentrated among 
source countries than among recipient countries. The top ten exporters of direct 
investment capital accounted for over 90 percent of the world total in 1989-93 
while the top ten recipients accounted for less than three-quarters of reported 
inflows. Nevertheless, six of the top ten exporters were also among the top ten 
recipients, and two of the other top recipients ranked just below the top ten as 
exporters (World Bank 1997). Another distinction between the exporter and 
importer groups was that the exporter group was a little more stable: eight out 
of the ten largest exporters of direct investment capital in  1969-73  were also 
in the group in 1989-93,  while only six of the ten largest importers were still 
among the ten largest importers in 1989-93. 
The data for the stock of outward and inward investment, which presumably 
reflect the cumulation of flows over many years, show similar concentrations. 
The top ten holders of direct investments abroad in 1995 owned 87 percent of 
the world total, while the top ten host countries were the location of  about two- 
thirds of  the stock. Six of the top host countries were also among the top ten 
holders (United Nations 1996). 
6.1.2  The Definition and Measurement of Direct Investment: 
Control versus “Lasting Interest” 
Direct investment is often discussed as if  it consisted entirely of the invest- 
ment associated with multinational corporations. Such a concept would match 
the theoretical literature on direct investment, but the data available do not 
follow it. Many aspects of multinational corporation activity are not included 
in measures of direct investment, and all past and present definitions of direct 
investment include transactions that do not involve multinationals. 310  Robert E. Lipsey 
The definition  of  direct investment and  therefore its  measurement have 
changed considerably over time. Definitions and measurements even now dif- 
fer among countries despite the efforts of  international agencies to push for 
uniformity. 
The United States was a pioneer in surveying both outward and inward di- 
rect investment. The object of  the surveys, as described in the 1937 inward 
investment survey, was to measure “all foreign equity interests in those Ameri- 
can corporations or enterprises which are controlled by  a person or group of 
persons .  . . domiciled in a foreign country” (U.S. Department of  Commerce 
1937, 10). The term “equity interest” encompasses all holdings of  common 
and preferred stock, advances, and intercompany accounts. No definition of 
“control” is provided, but control is the criterion for inclusion. 
The outward survey for 1950 does provide a definition of direct investments, 
“the United States equity in controlled foreign business enterprises . . .  as sta- 
tistically defined for the purposes of this survey” (U.S. Department of Com- 
merce 1953,4).  Four categories were covered: 
1. “Foreign corporations, the voting securities of which were owned to the 
extent of 25 percent or more by persons or groups of affiliated persons, ordi- 
narily resident in the United States.” 
2.  “Foreign  corporations, the  voting  stock of  which  was  publicly  held 
within the United States to an aggregate extent of 50 percent or more, but dis- 
tributed among stockholders, so that no one investor, or group of affiliated in- 
vestors, owned as much as 25 percent.” 
3.  “Sole proprietorships, partnerships or real property (other than property 
held for the personal use of the owner) held abroad by residents of the United 
States.” 
4.  “Foreign branches of United States corporations.” 
Three of these categories are part of current measures of direct investment, 
but the second one is not. An earlier definition had been even broader, includ- 
ing publicly owned companies with as little as 25 percent of stock in scattered 
U.S. holdings. The definition of control has been narrowed to mean ownership 
by  a company, a person, or a small affiliated group. The change eliminated 
from the total of U.S. outward direct investment mainly Canadian companies, 
probably including such companies as Canadian Bell and Alcan Aluminium, 
that for historical reasons had large numbers of noncorporate U.S. holders. 
The current definition of direct investment endorsed by the OECD (1996) 
and the IMF (1993) avoids the idea of control in favor of a much vaguer con- 
cept. “Foreign direct investment reflects the objective of  obtaining a lasting 
interest by a resident entity in one country (‘direct investor’) in an entity resi- 
dent in an economy other than that of the investor (‘direct investment enter- 
prise’). The lasting interest implies the existence of  a long-term relationship 
between the direct investor and the enterprise and a significant degree of influ- 
ence on the management of the enterprise” (OECD 1996,743). 
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cific. “OECD recommends that a direct investment enterprise be defined as an 
incorporated or unincorporated enterprise in which a foreign investor owns 10 
percent or more of the ordinary shares or voting power of an incorporated en- 
terprise or the equivalent of an unincorporated enterprise. .  .  .  An effective voice 
in the management, as evidenced by an ownership of at least 10 per cent, im- 
plies that the direct investor is able to influence, or participate in the manage- 
ment of an enterprise; it does not require absolute control by the foreign inves- 
tor” (OECD 1996, 8). 
The idea of control, which is behind much of the literature on multination- 
als, has been specifically abandoned. The fifth edition of the IMF Balance of 
Payments Manual points out that the concept of direct investment now used 
“is broader than the SNA concept of foreign-controlled, as distinguished from 
domestically controlled resident enterprises” (1993, 86). A single “direct in- 
vestment enterprise” could be part of several different multinational firms, pos- 
sibly from several countries. Duplication is avoided in investment flow and 
stock data, the main areas of concern to the OECD and the IMF, by allocating 
the financial aggregates to the various owners according to the extent of their 
ownership. However, data on the activities of multinationals, particularly those 
collected by  home countries on, for example, the sales, employment, or output 
of their multinational firms or their overseas operations, could easily contain 
duplication if this 10 percent criterion is used. 
6.1.3  Historical Background 
Direct Investment before World War I 
The history of  multinational firms, and of  the cross-border capital flows 
associated with them, foreign direct investment, goes back a long time. Mira 
Wilkins reminded us that “the origins of American multinational enterprises 
go back to the colonial period” and that “multinational enterprise headquar- 
tered in Europe has a longer history than American business abroad, going 
back to the middle ages” (1977,577). She described “modern” American mul- 
tinational corporations as dating from the 1850s and “investments over borders 
of modem European-headquartered manufacturing companies . . . to have ac- 
celerated in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.” She suggested 
that historical studies of international capital flows “often short-changed for- 
eign direct investment.” 
It is striking, in view of the current interest in multinationals and foreign 
direct investment, that many descriptions of pre-World War I capital flows, per- 
haps the largest in history relative to total income or fixed investment, either did 
not discuss direct investment at all (Iversen 1936) or combined it with portfolio 
investment, as in the compilation in Palgrave (1910, vol. 2), without consider- 
ing whether the determinants or effects were similar. However, Hobson did 
describe a half-century or more that “has witnessed an enormous rise in the 312  Robert E. Lipsey 
importance of the international company, in railways, mining, tramways, water, 
gas, electricity, banking, insurance, finance, land plantations, and other enter- 
prises” (1914, 125). “The international company has even extended to manu- 
facturing, but there it is still somewhat rare.” In one of his early books, John 
Dunning described the pre-World  War  I  situation by  the statement that “in 
1914, 90 percent of all international capital movements took the form of port- 
folio investment-i.e.,  the acquisition of securities . . .  issued by foreign insti- 
tutions, without any associated control over, or participation in their manage- 
ment.. .  . Several American  and  European  companies .  . . already  owned 
sizeable foreign manufacturing ventures, but these were the exceptions rather 
than the rule, and they rarely accounted for a major part of  the enterprises’ 
total activities” (1970, 2). 
The consensus was probably well summarized by Arthur Bloomfield‘s ap- 
praisal that “portfolio investment was a far more important component of long- 
term capital movements before  1914 than direct investment” (1968, 3), al- 
though Bloomfield noted  one exception, China, among host  countries, and 
one, the United States, among investing countries. Another apparent exception 
among investing countries, heavily weighted by  investment in China, was Ja- 
pan, with almost 90 percent of  its foreign investment in the form of  direct 
investment, as indicated in a number of sources cited by Mira Wilkins (1986). 
Bloomfield also noted that “before 1914 .  :  . the concept of direct investment 
(in its present-day sense) was not clearly distinguished from other (noncontrol- 
ling) equity investments in private foreign enterprises” (1968, 3-4). 
The idea that direct investment flows were negligible before 1914 was chal- 
lenged, at least as it applied to investment in developing countries, by  Peter 
Svedberg (1978), who claimed that it was an illusion stemming from the typ- 
ical methods of  estimating flows and stocks. These relied heavily on compil- 
ations of  government bond purchases and holdings and  on London Stock 
Exchange and other similar flotations. They therefore missed many direct in- 
vestments that did not pass through the exchanges.  Also, by assuming that none 
of  those that were publicly floated were bought by  controlling interests, the 
estimates classified some direct investment as portfolio investment. After re- 
viewing the data, Svedberg estimated that some 44 to 60 percent of  the $19 
billion of accumulated investment in developing (or “underdeveloped”) coun- 
tries in 19  13-14  was in the form of direct investment. Furthermore, similar ra- 
tios could be found for investment in many different areas and by many differ- 
ent home countries and were not peculiar to investment by the United States. 
Whatever the correct picture for the world before 1914, the history of U.S. 
inward international capital flows in that period conforms to the traditional 
picture. Foreign investment in the United States was overwhelmingly portfolio 
investment, to the extent that just before World War I about 80 percent of the 
stock of  long-term investment in the United States was portfolio investment 
(Lewis 1938, 546). Federal, state, and local governments and railways were 
the chief borrowers, and most of the borrowing was in the form of bonds rather 
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On the other side of the balance sheet, three-quarters of the U.S. outward 
investment stock in 1914 was in the form of direct investment (Lewis 1938, 
605).  Thus, even if it is true that the worldwide role of direct investment before 
1914 has been understated in the historical literature, its large rolejn U.S. out- 
ward investment was outside the range of other capital-exporting countries’ ex- 
‘ perience and far greater than in other countries’ capital exports to the United 
States. 
The divisions between domestic and foreign financing and between direct 
and portfolio investment can be thought of as ways of dividing up risks among 
different types of investors and borrowers. One could imagine that in the early 
history of the United States, foreign capital might have financed risky types of 
capital formation that domestic investors would avoid. However, the nature 
of  the projects financed by  foreign capital does not support this idea. Early 
foreign investment went mainly into government securities, probably thought 
of as relatively safe, although some of them proved riskier than was expected. 
Later investment went heavily into railroads. A common feature, aside from 
lending to the federal government during the Civil War, was that foreign portfo- 
lio investment went to large, lumpy, social overhead capital projects-rail- 
roads, canals, and later public utilities-relatively  safer investments and less 
dependent on local knowledge than the typically much smaller, and on that 
account, riskier enterprises in agriculture or manufacturing, which were left 
mainly to local financing (Edelstein 1982, 39-41,237-38). 
Many manufacturing enterprises were set up by foreign craftsmen or entre- 
preneurs with special skills. Since transportation and communication were so 
slow that it was impossible to manage these enterprises from abroad, the in- 
vestment was therefore often accompanied by  the migration of  children or 
other relatives of the foreign investors to manage the enterprise. Although these 
enterprises were a form of  direct investment, they were different from most 
direct investment now in that they were not controlled by parent firms as an 
outgrowth of their businesses, but by individual investors. Mira Wilkins (1989) 
referred to these as “free standing enterprises.” Over time they tended to be- 
come more independent and often eventually lost the status of direct invest- 
ments when their owners migrated to the United States. 
The Dominance of Direct Investment in US. Investment Abroad and 
of the United States in World Outward Direct Investment 
The United States has been, since its earliest days as a foreign investor, 
exceptionally focused on direct investment. An estimate for 1897, when the 
United States was still predominantly a recipient of capital from abroad rather 
than a supplier, showed more than 90 percent of  U.S. outward investment to 
be direct investment. By  1914, the share had declined to three-quarters, still 
far above the proportion in foreign investment in the United States or in world 
investment as a whole (Lewis 1938,605). 
The period of World War I saw the first major U.S. portfolio investment 
abroad, including large loans to foreign governments that outweighed total pri- 314  Robert E. Lipsey 
vate financing. By the end of  1919, direct investment had been reduced to a 
little over half of U.S. private investment abroad but to less than a quarter of 
total foreign investment including intergovernment loans (Lewis 1938, 447). 
The 1920s were characterized by rapid growth in both direct and portfolio pri- 
vate investment abroad but were unlike the earlier periods in that portfolio in- 
vestment became the predominant avenue for U.S. investment, tripling in value 
while direct investment only doubled, and accounting for over 60 percent of 
the growth in private U.S. investment abroad. By 1929, the value of U.S. pri- 
vate portfolio investment exceeded that of  direct investment for the first time 
(Lewis 1938,450,605). 
The Great Depression reversed the change in the composition of  the U.S. 
private foreign investment portfolio that had taken place in the 1920s. Half of 
the foreign loans extended in the late 1920s went into default (Mintz 1951,6). 
U.S. holdings of securities, even valued at par, were reduced by almost 30 per- 
cent (almost 50 percent with defaulted bonds at market value), and short-term 
credits were cut almost in half (Lewis 1938,454). By 1940, direct investment 
was back to 60 percent of U.S. private outward investment. It was a little more 
than that in 1950 and remained between 60 percent and two-thirds through 
1970 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1975, series U26-U39). 
U.S. government loans to foreign countries had expanded further during 
World War I1 and by  1950 were almost twice the total of all private investment 
stocks. Thus the restored dominance of direct investment in 1950 applied only 
to private investment. After  1950, U.S. government loans did not increase 
greatly, and by  1970, more than 70 percent of U.S. international assets were 
private and almost half were direct investment. 
The United States not only had much or most of its international investment 
in the form of  direct investment but also accounted for a large part of  the 
world's  stock of direct investment. In 1960, almost half of all the outward direct 
investment was owned by investors based in the United States. No other coun- 
try came close; the next ranking holder of  direct investment was the United 
Kingdom at 18 percent, followed by the Netherlands at 10 percent and France 
at 6 percent (United Nations 1988, table 1.2). The large role of direct invest- 
ment in U.S. foreign investment was associated with a large role for the United 
States in the world's  direct investment universe. 
6.1.4  The Importance of Foreign Direct Investment 
in Total International Investment Flows 
The first question we attempt to answer here is about the size of direct invest- 
ment flows relative to other forms of  international investment. For almost all 
countries, a three-way division is published by  the IMF,  separating interna- 
tional investment flows into direct investment, portfolio investment, and other 
investment. 
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vestment includes equity  securities, debt  securities in the  form  of  bonds, 
money market instruments, and financial derivatives, such as options, all ex- 
cluding any of these included in direct investment or reserve assets. The dis- 
tinction between long and short term formerly made has been abandoned on 
the ground that original maturity is now of relatively little importance. The fi- 
nal category of “other investment” includes trade credit, loans, financial leases, 
currency, and deposits, mostly short-term assets. 
The categories do not match those of the pre-1980 data we use, and some of 
the following tables therefore show an overlap for 1980-84. The data for years 
before 1980 are on a similar basis to later ones for direct investment, reported 
as “investment by,” mainly outflows from the reporting country, and “invest- 
ment in,” mainly inflows to the reporting country. That is the case for most 
flows, but there can be reverse flows on both sides. A country’s firms can repa- 
triate accumulated earnings from their foreign affiliates or sell foreign opera- 
tions to foreign buyers, resulting in a negative outflow (a positive entry in the 
balance of payments), and foreign firms in a host country can repatriate earn- 
ings or sell operations, producing a negative inflow of capital (a negative entry 
in the balance of payments). 
For categories other than direct investment, the flows before 1980 are re- 
ported on a net basis, not distinguishing between changes in assets and changes 
in liabilities. There is thus no natural world total for those categories because 
every transaction should enter as both an asset change and a liability change, 
and the total should therefore be zero. For these categories we approximate 
gross flows very roughly by aggregating the net flows of those countries that 
report net outflows in that category in each year. That is, we aggregate all the 
negative balance-of-payments  entries in each year under the headings of “port- 
folio investment, net,” and “other investment, net,” The alternative of aggregat- 
ing positive entries should give the same result if the data were complete, but 
of course they are not. Judging by the 1980-84 overlap, the 1969-79  estimates 
for portfolio investment outflow are understated by  almost 30 percent and 
those for other investment by almost half. 
The amounts of the three major types of investment flows, by these imper- 
fect measures, are shown in appendix table 6A.1. All types of international 
capital flows increased enormously. Since these are nominal values, they reflect 
the rise in world nominal income, which was, in 1990-94,  about five and a half 
times as high as in 1970-74.  All the forms of international capital flow grew 
faster than world nominal income. If  we take the overlap in  1980-84  as an 
indicator of the underestimate of gross flows during 1970-79,  we would con- 
clude that the flow of direct investment grew the most and that other investment 
hardly grew faster than income (table 6.1). Since 1980, where we do have es- 
timates of gross flows, portfolio investment has grown somewhat faster than di- 
rect investment, and other investment hardly grew until 1995, when it jumped 
ahead of the other two. 
The long-term trend, if there is one, seems to have been an increase in the 316  Robert E. Lipsey 
share of direct investment in total investment flows from 1980 through 1994, 
and possibly since 1970 (table 6.2). After 1994, the trend was apparently re- 
versed, with a burst of portfolio and other investment, but the direct investment 
share remained well above that of the early 1970s. 
All these statements have an important cloud over them. That is the persis- 
tent world current account deficit that has remained stubbornly close to $100 
billion a year, instead of  zero, as it should be. That deficit, which is really a 
discrepancy item, is so large that it implies that the correct figures for some of 
these entries could be very far different from those we are relying on to study 
and follow investment flows. The latest indicator of  how far some of  these 
numbers are from the facts they are supposed to represent is the results of the 
recently completed survey of  U.S. portfolio investment abroad, which found 
that the market value of US.-owned foreign securities at the end of  1994 was 
$910 billion instead of the previously estimated $556 billion, an addition of 
64 percent. 
Table 6.1  Growth in Three Forms of Capital Outflow 
Investment Type  Ratio 
1990-94/1970-74 
Direct  61.7 
Portfolio  49.6 
Other  5.9 
1990-94/1 980-84 
Direct  5.24 
Portfolio  5.97 
Other  1.08 
Source; Appendix table 6A.1, with 1970-74  estimated from 1980-84 overlap. 
Table 6.2  Share of Direct Investment in Total Capital Outflow 
Period  Share (%a) 
1970-74  5.8 
1975-79  18.0 
1980-84a  11.6 
1985-89"  20.7 
1990-9&  25.4 
1990-94b  26.2 
1994h  31.3 
1995b  24.8 
1996b  20.4 
Source: Appendix table 6A.1, with 1970-74  and 1975-79  estimated from 1980-84  overlap. 
"Excluding Hong Kong and Taiwan. 
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6.1.5  The Geography of International Investment Flows 
Origins and Destinations of Direct Investment 
Outward direct investment originates mainly in the highest income coun- 
tries, as can be seen from appendix table 6A.2. The United States was the chief 
source of direct investment in 1970-74,  larger than all the other regions shown 
here put together. Europe caught up in the second period and then far surpassed 
the United States. Japan caught up in 1985-89, and even exported more direct 
investment capital than the United States during those years, although it is a 
considerably smaller economy, with GDP less than three-quarters of that of the 
United States in nominal terms and less than 40 percent in real terms. After 
1990, Japan faded as a direct investor and the United States resumed its posi- 
tion as the largest single supplier of direct investment. 
The most rapid growth in outward direct investment was in the two devel- 
oping areas, developing Asia and Latin America, especially the former. By 
1990-94,  according to the IMF data, the outflow from the developing Asian 
countries had reached over 85 percent of the Japanese level. However, these 
data grossly understate the contribution of developing Asian countries and its 
growth in recent years by omitting Hong Kong, even though they include Tai- 
wan, decorously concealed under the title “Asia not specified.” The addition of 
Hong Kong doubles the figure for the outflow from Southeast  Asia in 1990-94. 
Hong Kong was  a larger supplier of  direct investment funds than Japan in 
1994, 1995, and 1996 (United Nations 1997,  annex table 13.2), and its addition 
to the developing Asia total brings that region to an important position as a 
direct investor. The timing of the growth in Hong Kong’s outward investment 
is similar to that in China’s inward investment, confirming the impression that 
much of the investment was going to China. Although there is no  reported 
surge in Hong Kong inward investment, it is hard not to suspect that some part 
of the outward investment originated outside Hong Kong. 
The flows to the main regional destinations for FDI are described in appen- 
dix table 6A.3. The two outstanding shifts in the destinations  of FDI flows over 
the quarter-century were toward Asian countries, both China and Southeast 
Asia, and toward the United States. The flow to the United States reached a 
peak in the 1980s,  when it was larger than the combined flows to all European 
destinations combined. After that, the flow to the United States receded some- 
what, and in the next period the major growth was in the flow to Europe. Direct 
investment in  developing Asia continued to grow rapidly and that in Latin 
America revived. In 1990-94, Europe resumed its earlier position as the main 
destination of direct investment. Most of the increase over the previous period 
was matched by similar growth in European outflows, an indication that a large 
part of the growth was in intra-European investment. 
There is more direct evidence on the nature of  European FDI. If  Europe 
were treated as a single unit, its importance as a source and destination for FDI 318  Robert E. Lipsey 
would be greatly reduced. Among the European countries that publish inward 
FDI position data, all except the United Kingdom had received 60 percent or 
more of their FDI stock from other European countries. And among those that 
published outward FDI positions, all except the United Kingdom had sent half 
or more of their FDI to other locations within Europe (OECD 1998). 
Inflows to the United States have been volatile in the 1990s, first dropping 
to low levels in 1991 and 1992 and then rebounding strongly. Inflows to Japan, 
always small, turned negative in  1989 and, after a brief  flurry in the early 
1990s, stayed below $1 billion per year in 1993-96.  Inflows to China, already 
far above earlier amounts, took off after 1991, reaching over $42 billion, al- 
most ten times the 1991 level, in 1996 (United Nations 1997). There has been 
some suspicion that part of direct investment in China originates in China it- 
self, routed through Hong Kong for various reasons including favorable treat- 
ment accorded to foreign-owned enterprises in China. If  that is the case, such 
“round trip” investment does not appear to be substantially financed by  re- 
ported Chinese direct investment in Hong Kong, which is quite small relative 
to inward direct investment in China. 
The major elements of the net flows of international capital in these regions 
since 1969 are summarized in appendix tables 6A.4,6A.5, and 6A.6. Negative 
numbers represent net outflows of capital and positive ones, net inflows. 
Europe and Japan were consistent net suppliers of  direct investment to the 
rest of the world and Latin America was a consistent absorber of such capital, 
as was developing Asia, especially in the last period (appendix table 6A.4). In 
1993-95, China far surpassed Latin America as a net importer of direct invest- 
ment (United Nations 1997, annex tables B.l and B.2). One odd case here is 
the United States, which shifted from being the world‘s major net supplier of 
direct investment during the 1970s to being a large net recipient throughout 
the 1980s before returning to its traditional role. The shift is sometimes attrib- 
uted to the devaluation of the dollar that started in 1985, and it is true that the 
inflow was at its largest in 1987-89, but the United States switched to being a 
net importer of direct investment capital much earlier, in 1981, and was a net 
importer through the period when the dollar was at its highest. Something more 
than exchange rates must have been at work. The other switch was in Southeast 
Asia, which, after absorbing direct investment on balance from 1969 to 1992, 
became a net supplier, mainly on account of Hong Kong, after that. 
The net flow  of  portfolio capital does not show the same consistency of 
direction as the direct investment flow, and some of the fluctuations are very 
large (appendix table 6A.5). Japan has been a pretty consistent capital exporter 
in this category since the 1970s, while the other regions have  mostly been 
importers. For the United States, portfolio inflows were particularly large in 
1985-89, just when direct investment inflows were also at a peak. In this pe- 
riod, the high inflow to the United States almost exactly matched the outflow 
from Japan. The fact that the peak period in the United States was the same as 
for direct investment suggests that whatever led to the large inflows was not 319  The Role of FDI in International Capital Flows 
Table 6.3  Reported Net Inflows of Portfolio Capital, 1980-96  (millions of 
US.  dollars) 
CountryRegion  Inflow 
United States  650,180 
Japan  -  506,320 
Europe  276,200 
Developing Asia  86,128 
Latin America  273,771 
Total  1,286,279 
~~  ~ 
Source: See appendix tables 6A.2 and 6A.3. 
peculiar to direct investment. In Latin America, also, the jump in direct invest- 
ment inflows in the 1990s was accompanied by a large rise in portfolio capital 
inflows. For the whole period since 1980, the regions listed reported imports 
of portfolio capital reaching over $1.25 trillion, while the only net exporter in 
the list, Japan, reported less than half that amount in exports (table 6.3). 
In the case of other capital flows, only one region, Europe, was consistent 
over time with respect to the direction of the flows, with inflows in every period 
(appendix table 6A.6). Every other region had periods of  both inflows and 
outflows, sometimes with abrupt shifts from one to the other. The United States 
was a net supplier of funds through 1979-83 and then became a net recipient. 
Latin America was almost always a supplier of funds, and the other countries 
showed no consistent role. 
The Regional Distribution of Total Net International Investment Flows 
The combination of  the various types of  net capital flows is the total net 
international flow of capital. Japan has been a consistent supplier of capital on 
the international market throughout the whole period since 1980, while the 
United States has been a major net recipient of international capital flows, es- 
pecially in the most recent years (appendix table 6A.7). Southeast Asia and 
Latin America have been pretty continuous recipients and were relatively large 
ones except when the United States began to absorb foreign capital on a large 
scale in 1983. Europe has mostly absorbed capital on net balance except in the 
1985-89  period. 
6.1.6  Differences in Behavior among Types 
of International Financial Flows 
Volatility 
As was  mentioned in the discussion of  historical aspects of  international 
investment above, different types of financial flows can perform quite different 
functions for both investing and receiving countries. One difference among the 320  Robert E. Lipsey 
types of flows that affects their functions, especially for the recipients, is in 
their volatility, a subject that has received increased attention since the Asian 
crisis began. We can compare flows of different types by asking how often net 
flows to or from a country change sign. That is, how often do inflows turn into 
outflows and outflows turn into inflows. 
For direct investment, among the fifty-two countries for which we have long 
runs of data, and data for each type of  capital flow, the average number of 
reversals was 2.50, indicating an average run in a single direction of over four 
years (table 6.4). The next most stable type was portfolio investment, with 
3.60 reversals on average, an average run in one direction of over three years. 
Other capital flows reversed signs 4.2 times on average. Thus the general im- 
pression of the stability of direct investment, relative to the other types, is con- 
firmed. 
These comparisons take account of the direction of  flows but not the size, 
which can vary sharply without any change of direction. We compare the types 
of flow with respect to their standard deviations in table 6.5. 
Table 6.4  Frequency of Sign Changes in Capital Flows, 1980-95 
No. of  Sign  Average Frequency  Average Duration 
Investment Type  Changes  of  Sign Changes  of Run 
Net direct  130 
Net porfolio  187 







Source: IMF (1 998). 
Note; Number of  countries is 52. 
Table 6.5  Ratios of Standard Deviations to Means for Various Types of 
International Capital Flows, 1969-93 
Other Long Term, 












































"Unweighted average of standard deviations for individual countries. 
bStandard deviation of aggregate net flows to or from region. 321  The Role of FDI  in International Capital Flows 
In the case of the United States, both portfolio and short-term capital flows 
fluctuated less relative to the average flows than did net direct investment. The 
United States was unusual in this respect, however. For Japan and for the three 
regions, the average for individual country volatility, as measured by the ratios 
of standard deviations to means, was lowest for net direct investment. The vola- 
tility of the aggregates in two of the three regions confirmed the relative stabil- 
ity of direct investment. There is a particularly wide gap in Latin America be- 
tween the volatility of net portfolio investment and the relative stability of net 
direct investment. 
Relations among Capital Flows 
If flows of direct investment respond to current economic conditions in each 
country, one might expect to find alternating periods of  larger outflows than 
inflows and larger inflows than outflows and, therefore, a negative relationship 
between gross outflows and gross inflows. As table 6.6 indicates, for a selection 
of  major exporters and recipients of  FDI flows, that is not the case. By and 
large, where there is a significant relationship, it is a positive one; direct invest- 
ment inflows to a country tend to be large when outflows from the country 
are large. 
To some extent, this relationship may reflect trends, or simply the effects of 
growth, which we may partially remove by taking international flows relative 
to GDP. The trend influence is Confirmed by the fact that fewer equations are 
significant, correlations are lower, and one significant negative relationship ap- 
pears, for Brazil; but the overall result is still that outflows and inflows are 
positively related, where there is any significant relationship at all. 
We can also ask how gross or net FDI outflows are related to flows of capital 
in other forms. The results for the thirteen countries used in the test are pre- 
sented in table 6.7. 
The strongest relationship is that between outward direct investment and 
outward flows of  short-term capital. Large outflows of  direct investment are 
accompanied by  outflows of short-term capital as well. There is also a much 
weaker positive association with net flows of portfolio capital. Net outflows of 
direct investment are negatively correlated with net flows of all other long-term 
capital and also with that part of it that is portfolio capital. Little of the variabil- 
ity in one flow is explained by the other, but there is at least some suggestion 
here of  substitution among types of  long-term capital flows, especially be- 
tween direct and portfolio capital flows. 
The Importance of Retained Earnings in Direct Investment 
One feature of  flows of  direct investment that distinguishes it from other 
forms of investment is that it can be, and often is, financed from the retained 
earnings of affiliates. The IMF and the OECD recommend that direct invest- 
ment flows include “the direct investor’s share of  the company’s reinvested 
earnings” (OECD 1996, 16). Unfortunately for our ability to make compari- Table 6.6  Summary of Equations Relating FDI by a Country to FDI in  a 
Country, 1969-94 
FDI By =  f(FD1 In)  FDI By/GDP =  f(FD1 In/GDP) 
Coefficient  Coefficient of 
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.38** 

































Note:  Numbers in parentheses are r-statistics. 
*Prob F <  0.05. 
**€'rob  F < 0.01. 
Table 6.7  Simple Regressions Relating FDI Flows to Flows of Other Qpes of 
Capital in Thirteen Countries 
Coefficient of FDI  Adjusted R2 
Outward FDI  X Short-term capital  .230**  ,148 
Outward FDI  X Long-term capital excluding FDI  -.016  -  ,003 
Outward FDI X Portfolio capital  .080*  ,014 
Net FDI  X Long-term capital excluding FDI  -.097**  ,039 
Net FDI  X Portfolio capital  -. 12 1**  ,059 
Net FDI X Short-term capital  .059*  ,012 
*Significant at 5 percent level. 
**Significant at 1 percent level. 323  The Role of FDI  in International Capital Flows 
sons across countries, many important capital exporters do not include rein- 
vested earnings in their capital flow data. Among the OECD countries, Bel- 
gium, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, and Norway are in this group. 
The United States is one country that has kept records of retained earnings 
of its firms’ foreign affiliates over many years, although there have been some 
changes in their treatment in the balance of  payments. The distribution, by 
type, of U.S. direct investment outflows in recent years is described in table 6.8. 
Although there are large fluctuations in the proportions, reinvested earnings 
are clearly the predominant form of financing of U.S. outward direct invest- 
ment. They account for more than half of investment over the whole period, in 
each subperiod, and in ten out of the fourteen individual years. The only year 
in which they were not larger than each of  the other forms of investment was 
the severe recession year,  1982. 
One reason for the importance of reinvested earnings in U.S. outward direct 
investment is that U.S. firms’ foreign operations are relatively mature, having 
started earlier than most of those from other countries. However, the large role 
of reinvested earnings is an old one for the United States. During the late 1930s 
and through World War I1 they were virtually the only source of additions to 
direct investment, and even when the pace of investment picked up after the 
war, retained earnings still provided over 40 percent of the growth. 
In the twenty-five years from 1950 through  1975, reinvested earnings ac- 
counted for more than half of the growth in the stock of U.S. outward direct 
investment, 60 percent in manufacturing and trade, and somewhat lower pro- 
portions in petroleum and in other industries including finance (table 6.9). 
Some more recent data, for countries that keep such records, are summa- 
rized in table 6.10, for both home countries and host countries, 1989-95. The 
large contribution of retained earnings to growth in direct investment, a charac- 
teristic of U.S. outward direct investment for so long, is not a universal charac- 
teristic of direct investment, as can be seen in the large negative retained earn- 
Table 6.8  Distribution by Type of U.S. Oufflows of Direct Investment 
Equity Capital  Retained  Intercompany 
Period  outflows  Earnings  Debt Outflows 
1982-86  26.7  84.9  -11.6 
1  987-9 1  23.6  64.6  11.8 
1992-95  34.2  50.7  15.0 
1992  37.6  41.8  20.6 
1993  33.0  40.4  26.6 
1994  24.8  62.4  12.8 
1995  39.0  56.3  4.7 
Source: US. Department of  Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis,  U.S. Direct Investment 
Abroad: Balance of Payments and Direct Investment Position (Washington, D.C., n.d.), diskette. 
Note: Intracompany transactions with the Netherlands Antilles have been removed. 324  Robert E. Lipsey 
Table 6.9  Cumulated Reinvested Earnings and Changes in U.S. Outward 
Direct Investment Stock: Total and Selected Industry Groups, 
1950-75  (billions of U.S. dollars) 
Change in  Investment  Cumulated  Share of 
Stock  1975/1950  Earnings  Earnings 
Direct Investment  Stock  Reinvested  Reinvested 
All industries  112  10.5  60  54 
Petroleum  23  7.1  10  43 
Manufacturing  52  14.6  31  60 
Trade  12  16.4  7.5  62 
Other, including 
finance  19  16.0  7  31 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce (1982). 
ings on  inward direct investment in  the United  States. The importance of 
retained earnings appears to be related to the age of the investments, the United 
States, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Switzerland being direct investors 
of  long standing. Much of  U.S. inward investment, on the other hand, is a 
product of  the late 1980s, and therefore very new during the period covered. 
Similarly, Germany is a relatively late entrant as a major direct investor, partly 
because much of its investment was confiscated after losses in two world wars. 
Other factors may also play a role. During the period of exchange controls, 
many enterprises were not permitted to repatriate their profits, particularly 
from developing countries. There are also differences and changes in systems 
of taxation of overseas earnings that affect where profits are made, where they 
are accumulated, and if and when they are repatriated. 
6.1.7  Summary 
Direct investment, as a flow of capital, is only partly related to the activities 
of multinational firms. Most of what these firms do, and most of their impact, 
is unconnected with current capital flows, and parts of the capital flows are un- 
connected with multinational firms. Over time, the definition of direct invest- 
ment has shifted from an emphasis on control across national boundaries to a 
vaguer notion of “lasting interest” and “significant” influence on management, 
and in the balance-of-payments data the enterprise is divided up statistically 
among owners of shares of  10 percent or more. 
The history of cross-border ownership of enterprises is a long one, and its 
importance as a part of international capital flows before World War I a matter 
of some controversy. However, it is clear that direct investment was more im- 
portant in total U.S. investment abroad than in total foreign investment by other 
countries and far more important than in foreign investment in the United 
States. As a result of this specialization in direct investment, the United States Table 6.10  Outflows and Inflows of Direct Investment: Total and Reinvested Earnings for Selected Countries, 1989-95 (millions of U.S. dollars) 
Total Direct 
Investment 
Share of  Total Direct 
Reinvested  Investment 
Share of 
Reinvested 
Assets  Reinvested  Earnings  Liabilities  Reinvested  Earnings 
(Outward FDI)  Earnings  (%)  (Inward FDI)  Earnings  (%I 
United States  368,988  184,508  50.0  308,242  -47,582  -  15.4 
Germany  149,700  10,849  1.2  28,005  -6,687  -23.9 
Netherlands"  86,549  9,159  10.6  48,025  8,225  17.1 
Sweden  5  1,406  12,742  24.8  34,359  4,327  12.6 
Switzerland  57,885  15,729  27.2  19,818  7,805  39.4 
United Kingdom  184,230  108,908  59.1  153,375  32,047  20.9 
Source: IMF (1996). 
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was the dominant holder of direct investment assets in the decade or two after 
World War 11. 
It is hard to assess the relative importance of direct investment as a method 
of financing international investment flows because of the offsetting of one set 
of flows by another. In the gross flow data, direct investment has accounted for 
a little under a quarter of flows since 1989 and appears to have grown in impor- 
tance since the 1970s. 
The United States was by far the major source of direct investment outflows 
in the early 1970s,  but Europe soon caught up and Japan almost did before fad- 
ing out in the 1990s.  Hong Kong became a major investor in the 1990s,  investing 
heavily in China. The United States shifted from being the world's  largest net 
supplier of direct investment to being a large absorber of such investment from 
other countries, especially in 1985-89, and then reverted to its earlier net sup- 
plier role. Latin America and Southeast Asia have been continuous net recipi- 
ents of direct investment. 
Portfolio capital has  been  supplied to the world  steadily by  Japan. The 
United States, at times, particularly in  1985-89,  has absorbed much of  this 
capital, on net balance, and Southeast Asia and Latin America have also been 
major borrowers. 
Total international capital flows, of which the United States supplied a large 
proportion through 1983, have  since then become a source of  capital for the 
United States, as they have been for China and Southeast Asia in almost every 
period. Europe also has been a net absorber of  capital in most periods, and 
Japan the only consistent supplier. 
In recent years, capital flows among the developed countries, particularly 
the United States and Europe, have been dominated by  portfolio capital. Direct 
investment has played the largest role in net outflows from Japan and especially 
in the inflows to Southeast Asia, China, and Latin America. 
The different forms of international investment flows not only vary in impor- 
tance among regions but have  different characteristics in other ways. Direct 
investment flows have been the least volatile among the different types in most 
countries, the chief exception being the United States, which has flipped back 
and forth from being the dominant net supplier to dominant net recipient and 
back to dominant net supplier. For other countries, and particularly for devel- 
oping countries, direct investment has been the most dependable source of for- 
eign investment. 
One reason for the relative stability of direct investment flows may be the 
importance within them of  retained earnings. These do fluctuate, of  course, 
with profits, but they rarely shift sharply into the negative once firms are well 
established. Retained earnings appear to be most important in outward U.S. 
and U.K. investment. There are some large negative retained earnings in recent 
years for foreign direct investment in the United States, relatively new  and 
perhaps purchased at the peak of real estate markets, but the general relation- 
ship seems to be that older holdings of  direct investment grow a good deal 
from retained earnings. 327  The Role of FDI in International Capital Flows 
Appendix 
Table 6A.1  World Investment Flows (millions of U.S. dollars; five-year averages) 
Direct  Portfolio  Other 




































279,69@  383,520 
346,895'  675,634 
294,75P  867,505 
303,104b  890,440 
276,721b  883,826 
684,525b  1,406,464 
778,432b  1,7  14,493 
Sources: IMF (1998),  World Bank (1995, 1997), and United Nations (1996, 1997, 1998) 
aExcluding Hong Kong and Taiwan. 
bExcluding  Hong Kong but including Taiwan. 
Table 6A.2  Sources of Direct Investment Oufflows (millions of U.S. dollars; five- 
year averages) 
United  Developing  Latin 



















Old IMF Data, 1970-84 
1,042  6,968 
2,133  16,000 
4,280  24,889 
Current IMF Data, 1980-96 
4,280  24,958 
24,590  75,591 
26,286  121,846 
18,089  131,789 
22,508  177,416 



















Sources: IMF (1998), World Bank (1995, 1997),  and United Nations (1996, 1997, 1998). 
aExcluding  Hong Kong and Taiwan. 
bExcluding Hong Kong but including annual average outward direct investment by  Taiwan over 
the period 1984-89. 
'Including both Hong Kong and Taiwan. Table 6A.3  Destinations of Direct Investment Inflows (millions of U.S. dollars; 
five-year averages) 
United  Developing  Latin 
Period  States  Japan  Europe  Asia  America 
Old IMF Data, 1970-84 
1970-74  2,070  126  7,181  708  1,308 
1975-79  6,092  123  11,474  1,423  3,270 
1980-84  17,965  262  15,202  3,641  5,214 
Current IMF Data, 1980-96 
1980-84  17,965  262  15,536  4,71@  6,308 
1985-89  47,773  101  46,226  11,5  12b  6,505 
1990-94  36,507  1,371  91,489  36,182b  15,287 
1994  45,678  912  84,642  59,753b  27,495 
1995  67,527  39  138,030  68,385'  28,838 
1996  76,955  200  120,109  77,995b  40,056 
Sources: IMF (1998), World Bank (1995, 1997), and United Nations (1996, 1997, 1998). 
"Including annual average figures for outward direct investment by  Hong Kong and Taiwan over 
the period 1980-85. 
bIncluding both Hong Kong and Taiwan. 
Table 6A.4  Net Inflows of Direct Investment (millions of U.S. dollars; five-year 
averages) 
United  Developing  Latin 















-  13,733 
-23,586 
-19,211 
-  10,857 
Old IMF Data, 1970-84 
-916  213 
-2,010  -4,526 
-4,018  -9,688 
Current IMF Data, 1980-96 
-4,018  -9,422 
-24,489  -29,365 
-24,9 15  -30,357 
-17,177  -  47,147 
-22,468  -39,386 
-23,242  -5  1,945 
685 

















Sources: Tables 6A.2 and 6A.3. 
Note: Net flows are inflows minus outflows. 
"Excluding  Hong Kong and Taiwan. 
'Including Taiwan and excluding outward investment from Hong Kong, but including inward in- 
vestment. 
'Including Hong Kong and Taiwan. Table 6A.5  Net Flows of Portfolio Capital (millions of U.S. dollars; five-year 
averages) 
United  Developing  Latin 



















Old IMF Data, 197044 
-  292  -691 
392  3,014 
-  1,784  -4,521 
Current IMF Data, 1980-96 
-  1,908  -12,981 
-69,458  23,802 
-  14,354  39,192 
-27,219  -66,265 
-36,575  5 1,246 



















Sources: IMF (1998) and World Bank (1995, 1997). 
Note: Net flows are inflows minus outflows. 
aIncluding Taiwan. 
Table 6A.6  Net Flows of Other Investment (millions of U.S. dollars) 
United  Developing  Latin 
Period  States  Japan  Europe  Asia"  America 
Current IMF Data, 1980-96 
1980-84b  -  14,399  -5,428  42,073  20,639  22,477 
1985-89b  29,093  36,522  1,468  9,769  2,895 
1  990-94b  85,088  -37,926  34,187  11,156  -9,412 
1994  75,967  -40,714  89,957  9,973  -43,513 
1995  35,579  -4,936  7,841  26,475  28,023 
1996  -75,558  36,288  53,420  46,640  -22,922 
Sources: IMF (1998) and World Bank (1995, 1997). 
Note: Net flows are outflows less inflows. 
'Including Taiwan. 
bAnnual averages 









United  Developing  Latin 
States  Japan  Europe  Asia"  America 
6,423  -  11,354  19,670  26,002  30,183 
124,205  -57,425  -4,094  16,863  8,871 
85,735  -  77,195  43,022  32,873  44,474 
13  1,472  -85,110  -23,455  46,832  47,036 
153,769  -63,980  19,701  67,272  58,891 
188,464  -28,098  -23,636  94,195  73,469 
Sources: IMF (1998) and World Bank (1995, 1997). 
Note: Net flows are outflows less inflows. 
"Including Hong Kong. 330  Robert E. Lipsey 
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2. Robert C.  Feenstra 
Facts and Fallacies about Foreign Direct Investment 
6.2.1  Introduction 
Foreign direct investment combines aspects of both international trade in 
goods and international financial flows and is a phenomena more complex than 
either of these. As its name suggests, it first involves ownership of the assets 
of a firm: foreign direct investment (FDI) is often defined as the acquisition of 
10 percent or more of the assets of a foreign enterprise. Second, it involves the 
choice of a host country for these assets. The choice of  where to invest will 
depend on cost conditions and the extent to which investment gives preferential 
access to the local market, and both of these considerations depend on trade 
restrictions and other policies in the host country. In this respect, the decision 
of firms to invest abroad will be a counterpart to the international trade policies 
of the countries involved. 
Third, FDI involves the choice of which activities to keep internal to a firm, 
and which to contract on the market: only the activities internal to a firm will 
be included in FDI, while other activities can be pursued by arm’s-length trans- 
actions between unrelated firms. For example, a firm investing in a country 
might bring with it some knowledge that cannot be effectively leased or sold 
on the market. Instead, it will set up a plant for local production and also ex- 
port, so as to profit from the knowledge it has; in this case FDI leads to a 
transfer of intangible assets (knowledge) from the parent to the foreign subsid- 
iary This argument can work equally well in reverse, whereby the acquisition 
of a foreign firm can bring with it some knowledge of value to the purchaser 
that could not be obtained by simply buying the products of that foreign firm. 
I will argue that increased inflows of FDI to the United States during the past 
decade have been motivated in part by the acquisition of knowledge. 
These three features of  FDI-ownership,  location, and internalization- 
make up the so-called OLI framework for understanding FDI. This framework 
stresses the multifaceted nature of any decision to acquire a foreign firm. Be- 
cause of  the complexity of this decision, one should not expect any simple 
model to account for the trends in foreign investment as it occurs around the 
globe. Nevertheless, one might still expect the broad facts to be well under- 
The author thanks Josef Memll for excellent research assistance, and William Zeile of the Bu- 
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stood. In this paper I will argue that this is not the case, and on the contrary, 
there is a good deal of  confusion about even the most elementary aspects of 
FDI, such as who is investing where, how much, and why. Some of this confu- 
sion is due to contradictory data, but in other cases, it represents genuine con- 
ceptual misunderstandings about FDI. 
To present the arguments in the starkest manner, I will organize the discus- 
sion around four fallacies about FDI. This presentation runs the risk of having 
the reader reject the fallacies as simpleminded, and not believable in the first 
place. But I hope each reader will find some degree of  plausibility in these 
fallacies, and indeed, each of  them contains an element of  truth. It is when 
they are taken as factual statements intended to hold quite generally that they 
become incorrect. 
I begin the paper with a summary of the major trends in foreign investment 
over the 1980-95 period. Following that I present the various fallacies, dealing 
with the magnitude of  foreign investment in Japan and the impact of  FDI on 
the U.S.-Japan trade balance; the extent to which multinational corporations 
control U.S. trade; the impact of exchange rate movements on foreign invest- 
ment flows; and, finally, the impact of FDI on the welfare of the host country. 
I conclude the paper with further analysis of recent trends in foreign invest- 
ment, and their implications for the competition faced by U.S. firms in interna- 
tional markets. Taken together with what I learn from overturning the various 
fallacies, this analysis can serve as a guide to understanding movements in 
FDI today. 
6.2.2  Trends in Foreign Direct Investment 
Theories of FDI often emphasize the links between developed and devel- 
oping countries. For example, the celebrated “product cycle” model of Vernon 
(1966) described how new products are created in the developed countries, 
where production first occurs, and then as the production process is standard- 
ized production will shift to lower wage developing countries. This shift in pro- 
duction need not occur within a multinational firm, but often it does, as Vernon 
rightly emphasized. While this is an insightful description of the dynamic pro- 
cess of product development and trade, it ignores the fact that the majority of 
foreign investment flows have been between developed countries. Thus about 
three-quarters of  the world stock of direct investment is currently located in 
developed countries, with only one-quarter in developing countries. In table 
6.11 I show the allocation of inward and outward FDI stocks between the de- 
veloped and developing countries over the years 1980-95. These data are ob- 
tained from United Nations sources, which are the best available on a world- 
wide basis but still have some deficiencies that I will describe later. 
Looking first at the inward stock in the upper half of table 6.11, the propor- 
tion of FDI located in developing countries fluctuated between 19 and 26 per- 
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Table 6.11  FDI Stock, 1980-95  (billions of U.S. dollars) 
1980  1985  1990  1995 
Total inward stock 
Developed economies 
Developed share (% of  total) 
U.S. inward stock 
U.S. share of  developed stock (%) 
Developing economies 
Developing share (% of total) 
Chinese inward stock 





































Total outward stock  513.7  685.6  1,684.1  2,730.2 
Developed economies  507.5  664.2  1,614.6  2,514.3 
Developed share (% of  total)  98.8  96.9  95.9  92.1 
U.S. outward stock  220.2  25 1  .O  435.2  705.6 
U.S. share of developed stock (%)  43.4  37.8  21.0  28.1 
Developing economies  6.2  21.2  69.4  214.5 
Chinese outward stock  0.0  0.1  2.5  17.3 
Developing share (% of total)  1.2  3.1  4.1  7.9 
Chinese share of developing stock (%)  0.0  0.6  3.6  8.1 
Source: United Nations,  World Investment Report  (New York, 239-48,  1996), annex tables  3 
and 4. 
ond half of the 1980s, during which time the stock of investment in developed 
countries nearly tripled from $538 billion to $1,373 billion. The magnitude of 
direct investment in the United States doubled between 1980 and 1985, and 
again between 1985 and 1990. Since 1990, the stock of investment located in 
the developing countries has grown more rapidly, which is in large part due to 
increased FDI  in China. This country accounts for 18.6 percent of the inward 
stock of developing countries in 1995, up from 4.1 percent just five years ear- 
lier. The vast majority of  FDI entering developed and developing countries 
alike comes from the developed countries, as detailed in the lower half  of 
table 6.11.' 
In comparison with these stock figures, about one-third or more of the in- 
wardjow of FDI in recent years has been going to developing countries, espe- 
cially China. For example, in 1995 the United States was the largest recipient 
of FDI, with an inflow of $60.2 billion, but China was the second largest recipi- 
ent with an inflow of  $37.5 billion. Table 6.12 provides detailed information 
on the inward and outward flows of FDI for developed and developing coun- 
tries. The surge in FDI flows during the second half of the 1980s both came 
from and was directed toward the developed countries: this flow reached $172 
billion in 1989. This was followed by  a fall in direct investment magnitudes 
1. Note that the total world stock of  inward FDI in 1995-$2.66  trillion-is  less than the total 
stock of  outward FD-$2.73  trillion. This discrepancy is due to different accounting practices 
among countries in recording the value of FDI, as I shall discuss below. Table 6.12  FDI Flow, 198S95 (billions of US.  dollars) 
1983-88”  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995 
Total inflows 
Developed economies 
Developed share (% of  total) 
U.S. inflows 
U.S. share of developed inflows (a) 
Developing economies 
Developing share (% of  total) 
Chinese inflows 
Chinese share of  developing inflows (%) 
Total outpaws 
Developed economies 
Developed share (% of  total) 
U.S. outflows 
US.  share of developed outflows (%) 
Developing economies 
Developing share (% of total) 
Chinese outflows 

















































































































































Source: United Nations, World Investment Report (New York,  1995, 1996),  annex  tables 1 and 2. 
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from 1990 to 1991, with a recovery that was  slow at first but has increased 
recently to reach $203 billion in 1995. The inflow of investment to China grew 
most dramatically from $4.4 billion in 1991 to $37.5 billion in 1995. 
In addition to China, the inflows of FDI to the developing world are concen- 
trated in a rather small number of  countries. In table 6.13 I show the top ten 
recipient developing countries for both FDI stock and flow, for 1995. China 
has nearly 5 percent of the world stock of FDI in 1995, which is about twice 
as much as the next highest country, Mexico. At the same time, it is receiving 
nearly  12 percent of the world’s  flow  of  FDI, which is about five times as 
much as that entering Mexico. The other developing countries with substantial 
Table 6.13  FDI in Top Ten Developing Countries, 1995 
~ 
Share of  Share of 
Total  World Total  Developing Total 
(billion US$)  (%)  (%I 












Total for top 10 












Total for top 10 
Total excluding China 
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Source: United Nations, World Investment Report (New York, 1996),  annex tables 1 and 3. 336  Robert C. Feenstra 
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361  a-;a  Intra-EU Stack 534* 
Fig. 6.1  Principal FDI bilateral stocks, 1995 (billions of U.S. dollars) 
Source: US. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, STAT-USA database. 
*Estimated by author. Intra-EU stock is for 1994. 
inward stocks and flows include Malaysia, Singapore, Brazil, Indonesia, and 
Argentina. Taken together, the top ten recipient countries account for 70 per- 
cent of the inward stock and nearly 80 percent of the inflow. 
The principal bilateral stocks and flows of FDI in 1995 are represented in 
figures 6.1 and 6.2. I focus on the "Triad" countries: the United States, Europe, 
and Japan. Bilateral FDI between these regions accounts for fully one-third of 
the world stock (which is $2.7 trillion) or of the world flow (about $3 15 billion) 
in  1995. It is apparent that stocks and flows between the United States and 
Europe continue to dominate the world allocation of direct investment, in addi- 
tion to intra-European FDI. Following these in magnitude are outward invest- 
ment from Japan to the United States and Europe and outward investment from 
the United States to China, Mexico, and Latin America.*  The large magnitude 
of FDI in the United States, and its steady increase during the 1980-90 period, 
should be seen as not that surprising in view of the tendency for FDI to concen- 
trate in the industrial regions of the world. The exceptions are the recent flows 
of FDI to China and, to a lesser extent, Mexico and other areas of Latin Amer- 
ica and Asia. 
2. Direct investment from Japan to China and investment from Europe to Africa are not shown 




I  Mexico,  I 
wr  \  i\ 
Fig. 6.2  Principal FDI bilateral flows, 1995 (billions of U.S. dollars) 
Source: US. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, STAT-USA database. 
*Estimated by author. Intra-EU stock is for 1994. 
6.2.3  Fallacies about Foreign Direct Investment 
Fallacy 1: Foreign direct investment in Japan is less than 1 percent of assets, 
sales, or employment. 
An often-cited figure is that foreign investment accounts for less than 1  per- 
cent of the value of  assets in Japan, or of the share of  sales or employment. 
This figure has appeared in widely read studies of foreign investment (Graham 
and Krugman 1989, 25; 1993, 16; Lawrence 1993, 85), within a popular text- 
book (Krugman and Obstfeld 1994, 162), and even in the Economic Report of 
the President (1994, 216). The source of this figure is a study by  Julius and 
Thomsen (1988), who reported data for  1986. The extremely low  apparent 
share of FDI in Japan contrasts with the United States, where the share of FDI 
in assets, sales, or employment reported by Julius and Thomsen is 7 to 10 per- 
cent, and with European countries (France, Germany, and the United King- 
dom), where it ranges from 13 to 27 percent. 
The 1 percent figure for Japan used by Julius and Thomsen is consistent with 
that country’s own statistics reported by the Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry (MITI). However, Weinstein (1997) examined these statistics in detail 
and found that they substantially  understate the actual level of inward FDI. He 
cited several reasons for the understatement. Only about one-half of the firms 
surveyed actually respond, and only firms with 33 percent or more foreign 338  Robert C. Feenstra 
ownership are even included in the survey: this percentage is far higher than 
the 10 percent criterion for foreign ownership used by the United States and 
other countries. Weinstein rejected the MITI data on foreign investment and 
instead constructed his own estimates using a published sample of  foreign 
firms operating in Japan. Based on this sample, he estimated that the share of 
sales accounted for by these foreign firms is about 5.6 to 5.7 percent of total 
sales, or overfive times higher than the numbers reported by Julius and Thom- 
sen (Weinstein 1997, 86).3  This figure can still be considered low in compari- 
son with other industrial countries, but then again, it is quite comparable to the 
share of  sales or employment in the United States accounted for by  foreign 
Unfortunately, the understatement built into the MITI numbers for foreign 
investment extends to other Japanese sources, particularly those of the Ministry 
of  Finance (MOF) and the Bank of  Japan, the latter of  which are used for 
balance-of-payments purposes. Neither of these agencies collects information 
from smaller foreign firms, so there is some understatement for that reason. A 
more serious problem, however, stems from that fact that reinvested eurnings 
are not included as a source of foreign investment. Thus, if an American firm 
in Japan funds additional investments from earnings, it would not be recorded 
as FDI. It should be noted that the exclusion of reinvested earnings from FDI, 
especially from data collected for balance-of-payments  purposes, is a common 
problem in various countries (though not for the United States). This is one of 
the reasons for the discrepancy between the worldwide inward and outward 
FDI figures in table 6.11. The reason this problem arises is that balance-of-pay- 
ments data only include transactions between domestic and foreign residents 
and therefore exclude investment due to reinvested earnings because there is 
no foreign exchange transaction. This type of  financial activity could in prin- 
ciple be captured by  surveys of firms, such as that conducted by MITI, but as 
we have seen this survey does not extend to all foreign firms in Japan. 
To further illustrate the problems with the FDI reported by Japanese sources, 
in table 6.14 I focus on bilateral U.S.-Japan direct investment and contrast the 
Japanese MOF numbers with those reported by the U.S. Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA). The BEA data are based on  a mandatory  survey of  U.S. 
foreign affiliates, and they include investment from their earnings (Mataloni 
3. Weinstein (1997, 85) also suggested that the stock of foreign assets in Japan as reported by 
MITI ($26 billion in 1992) should be at least four times higher (at least $100 billion). 
4.  In 1995, the share of total U.S. private industry employment accounted for by US.  affiliates 
of foreign companies was 4.9 percent, the same as in 1994 (Fahim-Nader and Zeile 1997). The 
gross product originating in U.S.  affiliates was $327 billion in 1995, which compares to U.S. GDP 
of $7,254 billion, giving a 4.5 percent share of value added. Eaton and Tamura (1994) argued that 
foreign investment in Japan is within the range of what one would expect from a “gravity” equa- 
tion, given that country’s size and distance from others. 
The government of  Japan is currently engaged in various activities to promote inward foreign 
investment, including the establishment of Foreign Access Zones, the provision of  low-interest 
loans by the Japan Development Bank, and various tax incentives such as the extension of a car- 
ryover period for initial losses on investment (see JETRO 1995a, 1995b). 339  The Role of FDI in International Capital Flows 
Table 6.14  FDI Stock and Flow between the United States and Japan (billions of 
U.S. dollars) 
Reported  Reported by  the 
by  Japan  United States 
U.S. stock in Japan 
1993  12.17 
1994  13.77 
1993  177.10 
1994  194.43 
1993  0.93 
1994  1.60 
1993  14.73 
1994  17.33 
Japanese stock in the United States 
U.S. flow to Japan 









Sources: Japanese figures from Japan MOF as quoted on U.S. Department of  Commerce, STAT- 
USA database, NTDB search queue. U.S. figures from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, U.S.  Direct Znvestment Abroad, http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/usdia-d.htm,  and 
Foreign Direct Investment in the United States, http:Nwww.bea.doc.gov/bedfdius-d.htm. 
1995).5  The first column of table 6.14 reports the stock or flow of FDI between 
the United States and Japan in 1993 and 1994, taken from MOF data, while 
the second column reports the comparable figure taken from BEA statistics. It 
can be seen that the Japanese MOF data substantially  understate the BEA data 
on the inward FDI stock or flow from the United States, while they overstate 
the BEA data on the outward FDI stock or flow.6 I have argued that the under- 
statement is due to the omission of reinvested earnings from the Japanese sta- 
tistics on inward FDI, and the overstatement on outward FDI appears to be due 
to the fact that the Japanese figures do not take into account depreciation or 
losses on investment. 
To put the Japan-U.S. investment flows into perspective, in table 6.15 I re- 
port the bilateral FDI stocks and flows between the United States and a number 
of  other countries. The Japanese inflows into the United States, such as the 
purchase of  Rockefeller Center and Pebble Beach in Monterey, California, 
gained widespread attention in the popular press. However, the United King- 
dom and the Netherlands have historically been even larger investors in the 
United States. By  1993, the Japanese stock of investment in the United States 
5. Benchmark surveys conducted by the BEA every five years cover virtually the entire universe 
of U.S. multinationals. The annual and quarterly surveys are not as extensive in their coverage, 
but data for smaller firms not surveyed are estimated by  extrapolating from the last benchmark 
survey. By including foreign investment due to reinvested earnings, the BEA is following the latest 
recommendations of the International  Monetary Fund and the OECD (Mataloni 1995,39-40). 
6.  It turns out that discrepancies of roughly the same magnitude can be observed in United 
Nations data on bilateral FDI flows between Japan and the United States, which is not surprising 
since these data are based on the Japanese MOF and U.S. BEA sources. 340  Robert C. Feenstra 
Table 6.15  FDI Inward Stocks and Flow for the United States by Source 
Country (billions of U.S. dollars) 
1993  1994  1995 
Amount  % of Total  Amount  % of Total  Amount  % of Total 
~~ 
FDI Inward Stock 
Total  466.7  502.4 
Japan  100.3  21  104.5 
Canada  40.5  9  42.1 
Netherlands  71.9  15  68.2 
Gex’Indny  35.1  8  40.3 
France  30.7  I  34.1 
FDI Inflow’ 
Total  43.5  49.9 
United Kingdom  103.3  22  111.1 
560.1 
21  108.6  19 
8  46  8 
14  67.7  12 
22  132.3  24 
8  47.9  9 
7  38.2  7 
60.9 
Japan  1.1  2  7.1  15  5.3  9 
Canada  3.8  9  4.0  8  4.5  7 
France  6.8  16  4.0  8  3.7  6 
Germany  7.7  18  6.6  13  8.2  13 
Netherlands  3.0  7  -2.3  -5  -0.2  0 
United Kingdom  13.2  30  11.1  22  22.1  36 
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, as quoted on STAT-USA 
database, www.bea.doc.gov/bedfdius-d.htm#fdius-  1. 
aNegative  values indicate a depreciation of investment values. 
had surpassed that of  the Netherlands and nearly caught up with that of  the 
United Kingdom. But there has been a reduced inflow from Japan since that 
time, reflected in part by  capital losses on investment.’ The United Kingdom 
remains the largest single investing country in the United States, followed by 
Japan and then the Netherlands. 
Fallacy 2: Multinational firms account for the majority of U.S. imports 
and exports. 
Graham stated that “intrafirm trade by MNCs accounted for almost 50 per- 
cent of US exports and well over 50 percent of US imports of merchandise in 
1991” (1996, 14). Numbers of this magnitude appear to confuse two types of 
trade by  multinational corporations (MNCs): the trade that occurs between a 
parent and an affiliate-“intrafirm”  trade-and  the trade that occurs between 
a multinational and all other companies it buys from and sells to. The second 
type is just an example of arm’s-length transactions between unrelated firms, 
and there does not seem to be any reason to treat it as special. The first type 
7. E.g., Rockefeller Center was sold back to General Electric by Japanese investors at a very 
large capital loss, and similar losses were taken on U.S. investments purchased during the “bubble” 
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Total intra-MNC exports  153.5 
Intra-MNC exports (% of total)  34.2 
includes only those products that are transferred internationally within a MNC. 
Since this movement of goods leads to issues of transfer pricing, which affects 
the tax liability of the corporation and tax revenues of the countries involved, 
there is good reason to focus attention on these trade flows. 
The magnitude of trade by U.S. multinationals and foreign affiliates in the 
United States is shown in table 6.16. About one-third of exports and 43 percent 
of  imports consist of  intra-MNC trade, handled between  a U.S.  or foreign 
MNC and its affiliates. On the export side, twice as much is transacted within 
U.S. MNCs as by foreign MNCs. On the import side, intrafirm trade through 
foreign MNCs is somewhat more than through U.S.  MNCs ($134 billion com- 
pared to $93 billion), but the majority of those imports by foreign MNCs are 
within wholesale and retail trade. A good example of this is imports of finished 
automobiles, where Japanese affiliates such as Toyota Motor Sales in Los An- 
geles handle the distribution of products into the United States. 
Tyson (1991) added another twist on the issue of  intrafirm trade by  con- 
trasting the patterns of American and Japanese firms. A substantial portion of 
imports to Japan are handled by Japanese MNCs, especially the large trading 
companies called soga shosha. For example, it is estimated that in  1990 the 
soga shosha handled more than two-thirds of Japanese imports and one-half of 
Japanese exports (World Bank 1994,111). Tyson argued that this contrasts very 
strongly with the United States, where rather than having our own firms man- 
age import and export trade, such trade is instead managed byforeign  firms: 
“Foreign direct investment in wholesale and retail trade in the U.S. is so sub- 
stantial, in fact, that by 1986 foreign affiliates accounted for 75 percent of total 
U.S. imports and nearly 70 percent of  U.S. exports. So while Japanese firms 
Total intra-MNC imports  230.4 
43.3  Intra-MNC imports (% of total) 
Table 6.16  U.S. Imports and Exports through Multinational Corporations, 1992 
(billions of U.S. dollars) 
Total US. merchandise exports  448.2  I  Total U.S. merchandise imports  532.7 
Exports through U.S. MNC 
U.S. parent to foreign affiliates 
U.S. parent to other foreign firms 




Exports through foreign MNC 
U.S. affiliate to foreign parent  48.8 
Manufacturing  11.6 
Wholesale trade  34.6 
Motor vehicles and equipment  5.2 
55.2  U.S. affiliate to other foreign firms 
Imports through U.S. MNC 
Foreign affiliates to US. parent 
Other foreign firms to U.S. parent 




Imports through foreign MNC 
Foreign parent to US.  affiliate  137.8 
Manufacturing  37.3 
Wholesale trade  89.2 
Motor vehicles and equipment  28.7 
46.7  Other foreign firms to U.S. affiliate 342  Robert C. Feenstra 
control Japanese trade with the rest of the world, foreign firms dominate Amer- 
ica’s trade” (1991,45). 
As has been shown, a significant portion of Japanese exports to the United 
States are indeed handled by their MNCs, with investments in the wholesaling 
and retailing sector. But the magnitude of these flows are not nearly as high as 
suggested by  Tyson. For example, in table 6.16 the magnitude of exports by 
U.S. affiliates of foreign corporations is $48.8 billion, which amounts to 10 
percent of total U.S. merchandise exports. Of this amount, $29.6 billion, or 7 
percent of total exports, is shipped to foreign parents in Japan. Similarly, the 
magnitude of  imports by  U.S. affiliates from their foreign parents is $137.8 
billion, amounting to one-quarter of total U.S. merchandise imports. Of  this 
amount, $71.2 billion, or 13 percent of total imports, is shipped by parent cor- 
porations in Japan. 
Fallacy 3: Exchange rate changes do not affect the flow of foreign 
direct investment. 
Of all our misconceptions, this is the one held with greatest vigor by econo- 
mists, at least until recently. The reason exchange rates are presumed not to 
matter is that FDI is treated like the acquisition of a financial asset. The deci- 
sion of  a Japanese firm to purchase an American Treasury bill, for example, 
will depend on the expected rate of return on the Treasury bill. The need to 
first convert its yen currency to dollars, and later convert the dollar returns back 
to yen, would be handled in the spot and forward markets for foreign exchange 
at the time of purchase. Thus there is no risk involved in this currency transac- 
tion, and the exchange rates involved will effectively cancel out of the decision: 
all that matters is the expected return on the Treasury bill as compared to alter- 
native investments for the firm, as well as the covariances between the returns 
on these various assets. 
This theoretical independence from the exchange rate of  FDI decisions 
seems to be contradicted by recent evidence for the United States, as illustrated 
in tables 6.17 and 6.18. Table 6.17 shows outlays by Japan and five other top 
investing countries for acquisitions of  existing plants in the United States, 
while table 6.18 shows outlays for new  These tables show a 
very marked increase in acquisitions following the depreciation of  the dollar 
in 1985, with a much smaller increase in Japanese outlays for establishments, 
and no variation at all in purchases of establishments by the other countries. 
The boom in acquisition lasted for about six years, slowing around 1991 but 
recovering since then for the United Kingdom and Canada. These numbers 
suggest that FDI for acquisitions is especially sensitive to the exchange rate. 
To  reconcile the theory with this evidence, several reasons why exchange 
rates will affect the foreign investment decision have recently been proposed. 
8. These figures only use data on new investments and do not include the acquisition of addi- 
tional equity in an existing U.S.  affiliate by the foreign parent, or plant expansion (Quijano 1990, 
31). Therefore, the data are less than total FDI  inflows, such as shown for Japan in table 6.14. Table 6.17  Foreign Acquisitions in the United States by  Source Country, 


















Japan  Canada  France  Germany  Netherlands  United Kingdom 
521  1,743  516  1,186  783  2,793 
469  5,100  801  800  408  5,309 
137  914  359  315  139  2,002 
199  718  167  378  360  1,448 
1,352  2,185  145  476  460  2,964 
463  2,494  593  2,142  579  6,023 
1,250  6,091  2,403  1,167  4,406  7,699 
3,340  1,169  1,949  4,3 18  204  14,648 
12,232  11,162  3,691  1,849  2,067  22,237 
11,204  4,196  3,295  2,216  3,351  21,241 
3,413  1,191  4,706  1,828  1,543  1,808 
1,643  954  373  1,398  1,113  1,621 
1,359  3,234  1,143  2,347  1,345  7,841 
1,018  2,983  1,253  2,701  1,083  16,855 
1,893  6,037  358  13,657  624  9,428 
15,875  1,675  10,771  2,003  2,189  12,200 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Foreign Direct Investment 
in the United States: US.  Business Enterprises Acquired or Established by Foreign Direct Inves- 
tors 1980-91  and 1992-95  (Washington, D.C., n.d.), tables 2,5E, 6.1, 6.2,6C, and 6D, diskette. 
Table 6.18  New Foreign Establishments in the United States by  Source Country, 
1980-96 (millions of U.S. dollars) 
Year  Japan  Canada  France  Germany  Netherlands  United Kingdom 
1980  75  213  83  238  867  273 
1981  147  984  104  349  163  869 
1982  450  282  124  285  191  1,126 
1983  193  354  128  206  132  918 
1984  454  402  186  2 10  102  75  I 
1985  689  420  161  127  192  708 
1986  4,166  412  88  184  295  872 
1987  3,666  107  96  347  188  494 
1988  3,956  198  508  24 1  147  321 
1989  6,206  206  174  219  279  1,806 
1990  4,584  201  114  159  177  898 
1991  1,944  2,263  271  95  118  361 
1992  1,277  397  33  566  219  634 
1993  706  563  106  793  730  397 
1994  1,696  1,145  151  627  454  406 
1995  1,865  444  859  498  261  249 
Source: See note to table 6.17. 344  Robert C. Feenstra 
The first is due to Froot and Stein (1991) and depends on the idea that firms 
have less than perfect access to capital markets for loans. Since an appreciation 
of their exchange rates make the firms wealthier in terms of their purchasing 
power abroad, this will increase their ability to buy foreign firms. In particular, 
the appreciation of foreign currencies against the dollar after 1985 meant that 
foreign firms were better able to purchase U.S. plants or establish new plants 
here. Note that this argument applies equally well to acquisitions or new estab- 
lishments, so that it does not explain why the largest increase in FDI in the 
United States after 1985 was of the former type. 
A second reason why exchange rates matter has been advanced recently by 
Blonigen (1997) and helps to explain the particular surge in acquisitions in the 
United States. This argument builds on the OLI framework described at the 
beginning of  the paper. The ownership implied by  FDI allows a parent com- 
pany to transfer knowledge to the subsidiary, but it equally well allows the 
parent to receive knowledge from the subsidiary. This knowledge can take the 
form of a product or process development, for example. Suppose that either of 
these can be usefully applied by the parent corporation in its own home market, 
leading to a stream of profits in that market. This will mean that the company 
purchases a firm in one currency (say, dollars) and receives a stream of  profits 
in its own currency (say, yen) due to the investment. Given that revenues and 
costs are in different currencies, it is certainly the case that the exchange rate 
will affect the decision whether to acquire the U.S. plant, and an appreciation 
of the yen would make it more likely that the Japanese firm will make the in- 
vestment. Blonigen (1997) has shown that this argument helps to explain the 
increase in FDI in U.S. manufacturing industries, especially those with high 
R&D. 
Fallacy 4: If foreign direct investment occurs in response to trade restrictions, 
then it harms the host country. 
The import substitution regimes that used to exist in Latin America and else- 
where led to inflows of foreign investment to “jump” the tariff barriers, and 
to counteract this, the countries imposed various restrictions on FDI. These 
restrictions have some, albeit limited, theoretical justification. Inward FDI  does 
harm the host country when (1) trade restrictions in the host country take the 
form of tariffs, (2) foreign investment does not lead to any wage increase, or 
technology transfer, in the host country, and (3) foreign investment reduces but 
does not eliminate imports of the good (Brecher and Diaz-Alejandro 1977). 
Under these assumptions, the tariff will artificially raise the rate of return in 
the protected industry, and this return is earned by  the foreign firms located 
there. Unless these artificially high profits are taxed by the host country, their 
withdrawal will be harmful to that economy. 
Recently, however, a number of developing countries have recognized the 
potential benefits of FDI and loosened restrictions on these activities. For ex- 
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ing the 1980s, and these actions were taken even before discussion of the North 
America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Together with the change in the 
policies of some developing countries,  there has also been a growing awareness 
among economists that losses from FDI are the exception rather than the rule. 
One reason for this is that FDI generally does lead to wage increases in host 
economies, as well as providing benefits through technology tran~fer.~  Another 
reason is that trade restriction in the host country often take the form of quotas 
or “voluntary” export restraints, rather than tariffs. In this case, even the lim- 
ited theoretical case showing losses due to FDI no longer holds, because the 
inflow of  foreign investment effectively reduces the need for imports, so the 
quota is no longer binding. A good example of this is the voluntary export re- 
straint on U.S. auto imports from Japan during the 1980s. This import restric- 
tion led to a large inflow of foreign investment from Japan, which had the ef- 
fect of lowering prices in the United States, thereby offsetting the initial cost of 
the trade restriction. In a world of rapid capital mobility, direct investment can 
offset the distortions created by trade restrictions and also offset their welfare 
costs. 
6.2.4  Analysis of the Trends 
It is easier to throw stones than dodge them, and this paper has taken advan- 
tage of that. Even among the most widely read popular writers in economics, 
there are some misconceptions about the magnitudes or implications of  FDI. 
In the process of explaining these, I have tried to outline the trends in FDI as 
it occurs around the globe. In this section, I will provide further explanations 
and analyses of these trends. 
Protection 
Since the early 1980s there has been a very  substantial increase in FDI in 
the United States. The reasons for this increase, and its implications, are still 
being debated. Among other factors, the inflow of FDI has been influenced by 
the threat of protection in various industries. This threat was triggered in part 
by  the tight monetary policy, U.S. recession, and strong dollar of  the early 
1980s. Bhagwati, Dinopoulos, and Wong (1992) have coined the term “quid 
pro quo foreign investment” to describe the inflow of foreign investment in re- 
sponse to protectionist threats. As they state: “There is certainly some plaus- 
ible, more-than-anecdotal evidence that the acceleration in Japanese FDI in the 
United States in the early 1980’s was due to a mix of ‘political’ reasons: some 
partly in anticipation of the imposition of protection, and others partly to de- 
fuse its threat.” They report a survey by  MITI of Japanese firms undertaking 
9. Lipsey (1994) showed that foreign-owned establishments in the United States pay  higher 
wages, on average, than domestically owned establishments. Aitken, Hanson, and Harrison (1994) 
and Aitken, Harrison, and Lipsey (1995) documented the positive impact of investment inflows on 
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foreign investment between 1980 and 1986,  where it was found that many were 
motivated by “avoiding trade friction.” 
The threat of protection reflects the ongoing tendency for the United States 
to move away from a position of supporting undivided free trade, as it did in 
the postwar years as the hegemonic leader of the multilateral system, to a more 
activist position in using its trade policies to influence the behavior of its trad- 
ing partners. The inflows of foreign investment resulting from such threats of 
protection should not be viewed as anything new, at least from the perspective 
of  other countries: a substantial amount of  U.S.  investment entered Europe 
during the 1960s and 1970s, in response to the moral suasion of those govern- 
ments. So while these flows have reversed direction in recent years, the reasons 
for the movement of capital has remained the same. 
An  empirical investigation of quid pro quo foreign investment was under- 
taken by Blonigen and Feenstra (1997). They examined the impact of Japanese 
FDI on the outcome of  antidumping investigations in the United States and 
found that inflows of FDI tend to reduce the likelihood of antidumping duties 
being imposed. The same has been shown to hold for the application of anti- 
dumping duties in Europe (Barrel and Pain 1999).  Goodman, Spar, and Yoffie 
(1996) described how the industry coalitions in the United States in automo- 
biles, semiconductors, steel, and typewriters were affected by the entry of for- 
eign firms; in most cases the eventual outcome was a reduction in the demand 
for protection. In sum, there is good empirical evidence that inflows of FDI 
have an impact on the demand for and the application of tariffs, and in most 
cases the impact is to reduce the use of  tariffs. This means that FDI inflows 
can have a positive impact, over and above the benefits from increased wages 
and technology transfer. 
Exchange Rates 
In addition to the threat of protection, I have argued that the depreciation of 
the dollar has played a significant role in increasing the flow of  FDI. I have 
relied on a new argument for the importance of exchange rates: that a foreign 
company purchasing a U.S. firm will be able to use the knowledge from this 
firm in its own home market, so that it purchases the firm in dollars but earns 
a return in its own currency. It is then certainly the case that the exchange rate 
will enter into the calculation of whether to purchase a U.S. firm or not (but 
not in the decision of whether to establish a new firm). I believe this argument 
is especially important in industries with high R&D expenditures and can ex- 
plain the influx of foreign firms into Silicon Valley. 
To complete this argument, however, it is necessary to ask why the U.S. 
plant in  question did not enter the foreign market itself, either by  exporting 
there or establishing a subsidiary of its own. This question is easily answered: 
the foreign market may  have  restrictions on imports and on inward foreign 
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preferential access to its own market and will be able to earn higher profits 
there from acquiring the U.S. firm than could the American firm itself. Indeed, 
there is evidence that foreign companies do pay a premium for U.S. firms when 
they are acquired (Swenson 1993), suggesting that some aspect of this acquisi- 
tion is of greater value to the foreign firm. 
This rationale for FDI therefore depends fundamentally on market imperfec- 
tions, giving foreign firms preferential access to home markets and therefore 
increasing the value of intangible assets (such as knowledge of process or prod- 
uct innovations) they acquire from U.S. firms. It is essentially the reverse of 
the traditional argument for FDI, whereby a domestic firm would  move its 
proprietary knowledge abroad. The idea that FDI in the United States is for the 
purpose of acquiring American knowledge may lead to the question of whether 
the companies involved are receiving the full value of that knowledge in their 
sale. While there is no reason to think that the markets are undervaluing these 
firms, it may be the case that state subsidies to FDI make these firms attractive 
targets for foreign takeover. A broad array of state-level subsidies are available 
to foreign investors, especially those investing in new  establishments. It is 
quite possible that states compete against each other in an effort to attract for- 
eign investment, ending up in a “prisoner’s dilemma” whereby the subsidies 
offered are too high from a national point of  view, but each state maintains 
these subsidies so that it does not lose out to others. For this reason, Reich 
(1991) proposed that an Office of the U.S. Investment Representative-analo- 
gous to the U.S. Trade Representative-should  govern the use of state incen- 
tives to attract foreign investment. 
Investment in Mexico and China 
At the same time as capital from Europe and Asia is entering the United 
States, there has been a substantial outflow of FDI to Mexico and China. This 
outflow is explained by the more conventional reasons of access to low-priced 
labor and  (for China) to large domestic markets. The flow from the United 
States to Mexico may have already stabilized following the establishment of 
NAFTA. But the flow of investment to China can be expected to continue for 
some time to come, though it will depend on the development of infrastructure 
and stable policies in that country. Japan and the newly industrialized countries 
of Asia have large and growing investments in China. Europe, by  contrast, has 
relatively little FDI there. 
There is an important difference in the rationale for FDI in China when it 
comes from elsewhere in Asia, rather than from the United States. Investment 
from Japan, Taiwan, Korea, and Hong Kong is largely for the “outward pro- 
cessing” of goods, whereby inputs are provided by those countries and certain 
stages of assembly and processing are done in China. The availability of low- 
priced Chinese labor reduces the overall cost of the final goods. Some of these 
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compete with American-made products on world markets. The use of China as 
an outward-processing  region for goods developed elsewhere in Asia therefore 
increases the competition facing some American products on world markets. 
How  are American corporations responding to this challenge on interna- 
tional markets? It appears that their investment in China is not of the same type 
as that done by other Asian countries. Rather, large American firms investing 
in China are attracted in large part by the huge domestic market in that country. 
These companies see the population of  1.2  billion, with low but rising personal 
incomes, as a potential source of future sales. Companies such as Boeing, Gen- 
eral Motors, and Motorola see their investments in China as part of a global 
strategy, designed to secure sales in China over the long term, but not necessar- 
ily resulting in short-term reduction of production costs. 
This characterization suggests that the competitive challenge created by the 
outward processing of goods in China, originating in Japan, Taiwan, and Ko- 
rea, will not be met by similar investment in China by American corporations. 
Rather, U.S. firms have the opportunity to meet this challenge by the outsourc- 
ing of production activities to Mexico, under NAFTA and the offshore assem- 
bly provisions of  the U.S. tariff code. These provisions allow U.S. firms to 
export intermediate inputs, have them processed in Mexico or elsewhere, and 
then reimport the final products while only paying duty on the value added by 
the overseas activity. As tariff reductions continue to take effect under NAFTA, 
the incentives for outsourcing to the so-called maquiladora plants in Mexico 
will increase even more. These plants should be viewed as the counterpart to 
the outward processing done in China for other countries in Asia. In both cases, 
the outsourcing of  assembly activities allows the parent firms to lower their 
costs of  production and increase their ability to compete on world markets. 
The outsourcing by  US. multinationals, especially to Mexico, and the out- 
sourcing by multinationals from elsewhere in Asia, especially to China, creates 
two  regionally  based production  networks that  take advantage of  the low- 
priced labor on each continent. The competition between these regional pro- 
duction networks is perhaps the most important outcome of foreign investment 
in the developing world and will continue to have fundamental effects on the 
pattern of trade and investment in the next century. 
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3. Carl H Hahn 
The changing role of foreign investment: Let me say first, “change” means for 
us Europeans something quite dramatic. At this time it means the end of priv- 
ileges for Europeans that have  lasted for more than 600 years, through the 
control of  transport and capital, through superior firepower and know-how, 
through superior education, and so on. Today, access to know-how is universal. 
All that is needed is a high level of education, social consensus, and participa- 
tion in the free market. More than 90 percent of the world has joined this club. 
We have a level playing field, more than some of us in Europe like. 
To be a global company you must maintain one quality yardstick worldwide. 
Our VW cars are made in Germany, Mexico, China, or wherever. You segment 
not only your manufacturing processes. You segment your engineering and de- 
velopment processes as well. When you buy a Golf today, the transaxle might 
come from Argentina, the engine and the rear axle from Mexico. The vehicle 
might have been assembled, if  it has four-wheel drive, in Bratislava, Slovak 
Republic, forty miles from Vienna, Austria. Component globalization requires 
an enormous degree of discipline, but it also reaps enormous benefits, taking 
advantage of regional cost differentials and permitting a high degree of  spe- 
cialization and division of labor. On the side, developing countries also benefit. 
They can attract world-class factories for global and not only local or regional 
demand, which optimizes the return on capital, one of the classical handicaps 
of investment in developing countries otherwise. 
More and more the most modern factories we operate are enjoyed by  work- 
ers in developing countries. Take our truck factory in Brazil, which is the latest 351  The Role of FDI in International Capital Flows 
one, and has all sorts of work processes that the German trade unions would 
not accept. Consequently, we employ only 300 people for an annual production 
of 30,000 trucks. Our 300  people do practically nothing but control quality and 
coordinate the vendors operating within our plant. 
Let me try to tell you the core of what I think I can contribute from my point 
of view. Volkswagen is a relatively young manufacturer. As a matter of fact, we 
are the youngest automobile manufacturer in Europe besides our “stepbrother” 
Porsche. The VW Company and one of our products, the Beetle, still in produc- 
tion in Mexico, are both about half the age of our industry. As a rule, European 
automobile manufacturers are not even European in their philosophy or man- 
ufacturing structure, but rather national-far  from global. Typically, the two 
U.S. manufacturers in Europe are European as well as, of course, global. The 
Volkswagen group, number four in the world and number one in Europe, South 
America, and China, is both European and global. According to the World  Zn- 
vestment Report 1997, among the top 100 transnational corporations (TNCs) 
Volkswagen ranks sixth by foreign assets, close behind General Motors. Head- 
ing the list are Shell, Ford, General Electric, and Exxon. If we go not by assets 
but by an index made up of sales, employment, and assets abroad, Volkswagen 
is number one among automobile manufacturers, followed by Nissan, Mer- 
cedes, Toyota, Ford, and General Motors. This is just a rough idea how global 
we have become over the past thirty years. 
How, you ask, has VW, the late starter, come to be so far ahead in so many 
races? In a nutshell, we have never enjoyed protection in our domestic market 
from the time the Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineering Corps of the 
British Army started up the civilian life of our company in 1945. (We are cer- 
tainly their most successful venture ever.) Moreover, after the war we lacked 
purchasing power at home, so we had to go abroad step by step as an exporter 
and as an investor in protected markets of interest. It is this latter role that I 
shall try to sketch, selecting three distinct examples: Brazil, the Czech Repub- 
lic, and the People’s Republic of China. I’m sorry not to select Mexico, but I 
am short of time. 
Brazil 
My first example is Brazil, the classic case for us. It turned out to be a very 
good experience, and I think for Brazil as well. The market potential at the 
time, the early 1950s, was small, and the minimum national competitive start- 
up volume and national investment accordingly. The local content volume re- 
quired was almost prohibitively (uneconomically) high. At the time, the ob- 
jective of  governments in  similar situations all over  the Third World  was 
expressed by  the buzz phrase “Industrialization at any cost.” There were few 
alternatives to industrialization, but these countries had to pay a certain (high) 
price as latecomers. In terms of automotive industrialization, I don’t know of k 
single country that would have (could have) started without protectionism in 352  Carl H Hahn 
the later, more developed period of the automobile. We were guaranteed closed 
borders and found an oligopolistic market with sleeping competitors, at that 
time, but certainly not anymore. Under these conditions, the price for the en- 
trance ticket was not too high when you had the right vehicle, and it was af- 
fordable for us, starting with a first-year production of  20 Beetles in  1953. 
What we did not realize at the time was the outstanding potential of our Beetle, 
its extraordinary strength in the marketplace due to the numerous advantages 
of its longevity in every sense (no model change). Our reward was a 50 percent 
market share and the self-financing  potential. Within a short time, we overtook 
all our competitors, who had mostly arrived after World War I. A local content 
close to 100 percent meant that our supply chain followed us from Europe to 
Brazil, even steel manufacturers. 
Consequently, during most of  the  1950s, as well as  1960s, the Brazilian 
economy lived through a period of rapid industrialization and growth. Indus- 
trial and product structures were simple. This was a time when you could repair 
your own carburetor. Consequently, the closed shop did not entail too many 
handicaps for the national economy at the time; on the contrary, I do not see 
any alternative. 
For many external and mostly internal political reasons, almost twenty years 
of  a mixture of  stagnation and inflation would follow. Price controls never 
worked, but they were lovingly, repeatedly applied. To ease a growing external 
indebtedness, costly export subsidies, some as complex barter transactions- 
100,000  cars to Iraq for oil-were  introduced, showing only short-term results 
at best. Enjoying high liquidity, as a manufacturer, as an industrialist, was a 
matter of  survival in those days of instability. The economic policy of  price 
controls induced capital to go in wrong directions. “Gray markets” developed 
and finally “exported” more and more capital abroad. 
The successful merger of Ford and VW in Brazil and Argentina, as a defen- 
sive measure, was a creative answer to the political and economic situation of 
the countries in question. We  established a safeguard, reducing the high risk 
of unpredictable government policies, which could expropriate your assets in 
weeks-for  instance, by simply delaying permission for price increases by the 
respective authorities. It was easy to control the manufacturer, but not the en- 
tire value chain to the final consumer. 
By our merger we had reached 50 percent market share and could attain our 
strategic objective of being the most cost-competitive manufacturer, in order 
to be “the last manufacturer to die.” We accomplished this mostly by common 
platforms. Volkswagen models got Ford platforms, Ford got Volkswagen plat- 
forms. We  closed consequently surplus factories, particularly in Argentina, 
where the market had shrunk to a fraction of its former size, increased working 
capital, and created liquidity-important  competitive advantages during the 
final days of a regulated economy in a world governed more and more by mar- 
ket forces. 
Reaching these objectives allowed us to exist without fresh money from the 
parents and to be profitable again. This all was viable, however, only up to the 353  The Role of FDI in International Capital Flows 
day of the introduction of  a market economy Harvard-style in the 1990s. By 
then the industrial world had changed radically in complexity, in technology, 
and in sophistication. The Brazilian economy was unprepared for this new 
world; its industry was less competitive internationally than ever-a  textbook 
case. Already by  1994, however, a $20 billion investment program in new 
plants and products over five years was the Brazilian automotive industry’s 
response to sound economic policies. A new chapter of  intense competition 
and rapid growth began instantly, partly also in response to the opening of the 
market to car imports. Enormous forces were set loose. The consumer was the 
great winner. 
One of our most successful products in Brazil at the time, and still today, 
was a Volkswagen Bus type of multipurpose vehicle, which had a 1949 plat- 
form. Three new factories, meanwhile, two for Volkswagen, one for Audi, have 
already been put onstream. What a change, what a contrast. 
Brazil has become the largest recipient of foreign capital in Latin America, 
with nearly $10 billion in 1996, up from $2 billion in 1992. These figures are 
indirect proof of  the automotive industry’s key role as a central driver in an 
economy. Brazil and Argentina will soon be able to enter the worldwide divi- 
sion of labor, one of  the key elements for becoming competitive on a global 
scale. 
However, a period of overcapacity can be expected for some time in Brazil 
and Argentina, intensified by  new players and all-new model lines. Conse- 
quently, Brazil will become a highly competitive marketplace, with falling 
prices. Certainly, Brazil will become a big player in the league of the world 
automobile industry, searching, also for reason of overcapacity, for export mar- 
kets, assisted by the global structure of the multinationals. 
To summarize, in Brazil and most of South America the future has finally 
arrived. The year 2000 will see a new Brazil, forging as the largest economy 
of South America the integration of Mercosur-not  an overnight process. I am 
also encouraged by the fact that the month before last we had for the first time 
no inflation in Brazil, at least for one month. 
Czech Republic 
My second example is investing in a former socialist economy, almost forty 
years later. Skoda or Tatra were known to us at Volkswagen for many good 
reasons. We  had even volunteered to pay a royalty for the Volkswagen Beetle 
to Tatra. (The designer of the Beetle had come indirectly from Tatra.) We kept 
in touch with the Czech automobile industry during the Comecon days and 
were ready to go when the Iron Curtain came down. Thank God only two or 
three competitors followed at the time. Many were busy in Russia, tempted by 
Gorbachev. For a Western automobile manufacturer, however, there was in my 
mind no alternative to Skoda. Whoever owned Skoda would not only enjoy 
preferential access to the Czech Republic’s market, inheriting a sales network 
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After buying a controlling interest in  Skoda, we  encountered managers 
much closer to the West, and products and factories head and shoulders above 
what we had found in the extremely run-down East German Trabi factories. 
The East Germans had had to operate under extremely adverse conditions and 
were never permitted to dialogue with us, being hermetically separated from 
the Western world, in contrast to their Czech neighbors. 
In East Germany, near Zwickau, Saxony, we found, however, an extremely 
modern assembly plant built and finished one year before the Iron Curtain 
came down. On the day this factory "opened" it was mothballed. Within six 
months, the first VW  left the assembly line. In Bratislava, Slovak Republic, 
forty miles from Vienna, Austria, we also "found" an automobile factory ten 
years old, with immediate access to the Danube, to rail, to superhighway;  never 
used, mothballed. One hundred and fifty thousand VW passenger cars will be 
assembled in Bratislava in 1998, besides transmissions. 
No question, this was a market- and cost-motivated investment by Volkswa- 
gen advantaged by the closeness to our factories in both western and now also 
eastern Germany and the markets of  central Europe in general. The Czech 
people we had found at Skoda were determined to prove to the Germans how 
good  they  were. Vaclav  Klaus  showed  shrewdness in  introducing market- 
oriented reforms, as JZ  Weigl has described (chap. 2.3), and uniquely, quite a 
few politicians in the Czech Republic had prepared for the end of communism, 
even at universities in the United States and Great Britain. 
Of course our investment entailed know-how imports in all fields, tangible 
and intangible assets, the opening of  all our marketing channels worldwide, 
integration into our global division of labor, and the provision of benchmarks 
for every industrial activity or function-all  this happened overnight, free of 
charge. In particular, access to our marketing channels, which took enormous 
capital and many, many years to create, made it a win-win situation. 
In parallel, we educated the vendor industries of  the Czech Republic and 
surrounding countries to Western standards, gave them chances to export, to 
integrate into our global sourcing process, and supplied the engineering and 
research know-how they needed to catch up. Their universities received grants 
from the Volkswagen Foundation and research projects from our engineering 
departments. We helped them to establish contacts with the universities where 
we operate. 
Our expectations in eastern Europe have been fulfilled (except the quality 
and effectiveness of reforms in the former Soviet Union, which we had conse- 
quently to exclude from our FDI plans at the time, notwithstanding tempting 
offers by the governments). Our experiences as an investor in Poland, Slovakia, 
and Hungary have been equally good. In Slovakia and Hungary, the element of 
vertical integration allowed by component production in these locations played 
an additional important role in our investment strategy to improve our Euro- 
pean cost structure, a process assisted by  introducing common platforms for 
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In 1996,  the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland accounted for 68 percent 
of total inflows of FDI to central and eastern Europe, mostly privatization re- 
lated, from TNCs not only from western Europe and the United States but also 
from Asia. In particular, the Republic of Korea moved into first place by  for- 
eign assets, among the top fifty TNCs based in developing economies. Sum- 
ming up, it was possible to enter central Europe successfully through FDI dur- 
ing the reforms toward a free market economy. Setbacks and political changes, 
particularly in Poland and Hungary, did  not discourage us. In  some cases 
“communist” and socialist governments of a completely new type took over. 
They continued market-oriented economic reforms, trying to avoid the mis- 
takes of their predecessor governments, which had disappointed the electorate 
in some of the reform countries. 
In our case, we also obtained a new brand of strategic importance with in- 
ternational potential and historic value, a brand with a century of automotive 
tradition, quality people, marketing channels in central Europe, market share, 
virgin markets for the remainder of  our automobile divisions, high-quality 
workmanship, manufacturing capacities, new  vendors,  and  specialists very 
much at home in eastern Europe. This permitted us to create our fourth auto- 
mobile division on a solid base. 
In the first half of 1997, according to J. D. Power, a U.S. research firm  prob- 
ably known to you, Skoda was the number one European car in the United King- 
dom in customer satisfaction. Today, you can produce quality virtually every- 
where provided you  conquer the hearts of  your workers, train and motivate 
them, and give them the prerequisites for quality work through your design 
policies and engineering and by  integrating them in all processes, benefiting 
from their experience and intellectual potential, as you do with your vendors. 
China 
My third point is about the People’s Republic of China. We started negotiat- 
ing with the Chinese government in the early 1980s. The communist leaders 
convinced us  with the early and dramatic success of  their clearly market- 
oriented reform policies. They practiced what they preached. I also took con- 
fidence indirectly but most importantly from the fact that almost every Chinese 
leader had not only more than one child but many studying in the United 
States-in  my mind an insurance policy for the future political direction of the 
country and a strategic advantage for the United States of far-reaching impor- 
tance. 
We  got to know each other well through frequent visits to Beijing and 
Shanghai. Zhu Rongji was the mayor of Shanghai in those days. The Chinese 
leaders on official or informal visits to Germany almost never left out Wolfs- 
burg, our headquarters. This permitted us to underline our policies with hard 
facts. Eventually, we even traveled together to Mexico and Brazil, in order to 
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to local circumstances and to be a good corporate citizen. At the same time we 
pursued the careful contract negotiations that would establish the very detailed 
legal framework necessary because Western civil and commercial legislation 
is lacking in China. One of the shareholders in our 50/50  joint venture was the 
Bank of  China, so we felt quite sure of the availability of  foreign exchange, 
which we needed in the beginning. 
In contrast to the tempting offers of  the Russian perestroika leadership a 
short while before, we  did not start with an initial capacity of  hundreds of 
thousands, ending with one million units per annum within a short time, but 
with a trial assembly in the first year of  500, followed by  2,000 in the second 
year, doubling this number each year until we rapidly reached 250,000, always 
maintaining a market share of better than 50 percent. 
Soon, a second joint venture would follow, not in Shanghai but in Chang- 
chun, province of  Jiling, the former Manchuria, with  the First Automobile 
Works (FAW), the birthplace of the Chinese auto industry in 1953. FAW  was a 
stepping stone for many leading personalities of this country. Volume increases 
will gradually permit us to update our product program, which was kept simple 
initially to permit a successful learning curve. Soon volume will permit us to 
amortize new products in line with the international cycle of  model change. 
This in turn will permit us to use this area as a base for exports to the Asia 
Pacific region with products made in China. 
Let me summarize a few points, which I think, helped us greatly. Shanghai 
was able to reach a local content of  90 percent. Thanks also to the military 
industry, Norinco helped us to increase our local content rapidly, and to reach 
quality levels in line with our standards. We exported engines to Europe within 
three years. Of course this process was accompanied by vendor industries from 
Europe and the United States, representing an enormous inflow of capital and 
know-how. Changchun was  supplied with CKD packs for Golf  production 
from South Africa. The manufacturing equipment came from Westmoreland, 
Pennsylvania. CKD packs for the VW Santana, Shanghai, came from Brazil. 
All this was proof that our global network was functioning in practice. We 
also benefit from a certain degree of component commonality between Shang- 
hai and Changchun, with resulting savings in investment, higher volume, and 
lower cost. Audi became the government vehicle, replacing the Red Flag. A 
team of Chinese VW engineers and their Brazilian counterparts, connected via 
satellite, did most of the development work for a major facelift for the Santana, 
a vehicle that is produced in both countries. 
We emphasized not only that we were prepared to give know-how in engi- 
neering and development but that we insist, in all countries where we operate, 
on mobilizing human intellectual talent and potential. We  include the local 
workforce in our worldwide network of development and engineering activi- 
ties. A German type of  apprentice school in Shanghai with more than 200 
pupils educates first-class craftsman from day one, and at any time there are at 
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or manufacturing. Changchun was the first production site of our latest envi- 
ronmentally friendly five-valve engine. Nobody anywhere in the world pro- 
duces a five-valve engine but our group, when I exclude Ferrari. Consequently, 
China is about to become one of the most advanced industrialized countries- 
and not only in skyscraper production-thanks  to FDI. Furthermore, Chinese 
universities do research work for us and receive grants from the Volkswagen 
Foundation. Volkswagen has created an R&D center in China, besides doing 
development work in existing factories. During most of our time in China, the 
Shanghai factory was the “Joint Venture of the Year” and had a return on sales 
better than 10 percent according to official publications. 
Early birds have a better chance to finance their investments partially by 
self-financing.  The opposite is true for a latecomer. The price of entry increases 
constantly. No wonder China has been the largest developing country recipient 
of FDI since 1992, averaging $35 billion annually. China is attractive to all of 
us not only because of  its size but because its economic growth potential, 
which will probably make it the world’s  number one economy by  the early 
2000s on the basis of their political stability and policies. Intelligence and hard 
work, not only low wages, make it an ideal platform for serving Asia Pacific 
markets, enjoying a healthy current accounts surplus situation. China is num- 
ber one in dollar reserves already, even without including Hong Kong, which 
I feel complements Zhu Rongji’s economic policies, considering the rate of 
GDP growth year after year and the low inflation rate. 
No wonder Volkswagen continues to expand in China, taking advantage of 
the “socialist market economy” transition policy, under a communist govern- 
ment that has avoided the mistakes and tragedies we had to observe in the 
former Soviet Union. Naturally, there are risks, but I do not know of any entre- 
preneurial activity-or  any kind of  progress, for that matter-without  risk, 
and I don’t think that China tops the list of risky countries. 
The entry of  three billion people from Asia into the world economy with 
high potential qualifications; the gradual entry, slower than expected, of India; 
and hopefully one day the entry of Russia-together  with what we observe in 
Latin America, these elements give us a chance no generation before us even 
dreamt of. As a consequence, globalization will take on new dimensions rap- 
idly. Let us hope that politics will be able to master the new complexities and 
global risks, permitting us to harvest the fruits of FDI and its built-in know- 
how transfer. 
Some final remarks on FDI in Europe: I can promise you there is almost no 
place in Europe where the investor will not be lured by  subsidies. It’s a sheer 
fight for investors via subsidies. A most unhealthy development, as you can 
imagine, more weakening than strengthening.  There are all sorts of advantages 
you will be offered to come to central Europe as an investor as well. Not only 
do TNCs compete with each other, but all countries compete for investment 
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4. George N. Hatsopoulos 
Of  all economic issues of interest to noneconomists, I have found none that 
evokes more of a love-hate reaction than foreign direct investment. Most recog- 
nize the benefits it provides to a country, such as added financial capital as 
well as intangible capital in the form of technology or market presence. Many, 
however, worry about a real or perceived transfer of control and returns from 
domestic to foreign owners. In view of the vast changes that have happened in 
the world, I would like to raise the possibility that FDI, as it is currently mea- 
sured, may  become disconnected from its traditionally assigned attributes. I 
have no aggregate data to support such a hypothesis, only anecdotal informa- 
tion pertaining to Thermo Electron, the company I run. 
Thermo Electron’s FDI consists mostly of  acquisitions of  foreign-owned 
corporations. Only a small part of it, less than 5 percent, is invested to expand 
existing operations abroad. The motivation of the latter group of investments 
is not economic. Physical production, technology generation, and general man- 
agement are done much more efficiently in U.S. locations. Labor laws that 
prevail in all other countries are the main cause of that disparity. Nevertheless, 
we need to invest small amounts in locations abroad to keep up the morale of 
our people there and maintain their ability to serve local customers. 
Our acquisition program is substantial: in the past five years, we have ac- 
quired over eighty corporations at a cost of over $2 billion. So far this year, we 
have made twelve acquisitions at a total cost approaching $1 billion. 
The first quarter of this year, we spent $0.5 billion to acquire a U.K. corpora- 
tion called Life Sciences. In the flow-of-funds tabulation, this transaction will 
appear as FDI in the United Kingdom, implying that Americans increased their 
ownership of a manufacturing operation in the United Kingdom valued at $0.5 
billion (out of  $19 billion total outflow from the United States). The reality, 
however, is different for two reasons: first, two-thirds of Life Sciences plants 
are located in the United States, and second, one-third of the owners of Thermo 
Electron are not Americans. (These facts translate into FDI of only $0.11 bil- 
lion.) 
The situation  just described is obviously exceptional. Nevertheless, it is less 
of  an exception than it would have been twenty years ago, and current trends 
indicate that it will be even less of an exception twenty years from now. We 
have already witnessed a dramatic increase in the mobility of capital, goods, 
and services, as well as technology and know-how. We also see increased mo- 
bility of owners of capital. Is Mr. Murdoch really an Australian? To my knowl- 
edge, he invests mostly outside Australia where he also spends most of  his 
time and money. These observations make me wonder whether the attributes 
historically assigned to FDI will continue to be valid for long. 359  The Role of FDI in International Capital Flows 
Discussion Summary 
Robert Feenstru commented that Hahn’s description of  Volkswagen’s global 
sourcing procedures represent a substantial challenge to existing economic 
models. He went on to note that recent Canadian statistics suggest that 90 
percent of  Canadian trade is in intermediate inputs, further challenging the 
existing methods employed by trade theorists. Feenstra asked whether the tech- 
nology transfer associated with foreign direct investment works in reverse, 
with host countries providing innovations that are transported through multina- 
tionals back to the home countries. 
Curl Huhn replied that these global sourcing procedures have been fostered 
by technological advances in design processes, miniaturization,  and a dramatic 
reduction in transport costs. For example, the cost of shipping a car from Eu- 
rope to the United States is equivalent to the cost of transporting a car across 
the United States. As a consequence, some products, such as the new Beetle, 
will be assembled only in one place, Mexico, and transported to various desti- 
nations around the world. Furthermore, Hahn noted that the internal competi- 
tion created under a global sourcing procedure is an enormous source of inno- 
vation and progress for Volkswagen. Regarding reverse technology transfers, 
Hahn saw great scope for such transfers. The only obstacle is the arrogance of 
acquiring companies,  particularly U.S.  companies,  in assuming that local firms 
do not have important ideas to contribute. 
George Hutsopoulos noted that reverse technology transfer is less likely to 
involve raw technology and more likely to be local market knowledge. Further- 
more, this exchange of market knowledge and managerial expertise constitutes 
a major aspect of  the value added of  foreign direct investment for Thermo 
Electron. 
Robert Lipsey noted that the cases provided by  Volkswagen and Thermo 
Electron illustrate broader trends in foreign direct investment. American ex- 
pansion in foreign direct investment came largely in the 1970s, and American 
firms have pulled back subsequently. In contrast, German and Japanese firms 
have become much more aggressive in the 1980s and 1990s. Lipsey also noted 
that the complexities illustrated  by Thermo Electron’s recent acquisition of Life 
Sciences are difficult for statisticians to capture in aggregate data. American 
data are unique in capturing these complexities as questionnaires  inquire about 
ultimate ownership. 
Huhn replied that U.S. firms are as aggressive as they have ever been. How- 
ever, U.S. firms are now more likely to use their foreign affiliates, as in the 
case of GM-Opel, to make further investments. Similarly, Hutsopoulos sug- 
gested that Thermo Electron is expanding as aggressively and quickly as ever. 
Furthermore, he perceived the opportunities abroad to be greater than ever 
before. 
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non-U.S. investors is related to its acquisition and expansion patterns through- 
out the world. 
Hutsopoulos replied that these financing and investment plans are distinct 
because capital raised in Europe is raised in dollars and not used directly to 
finance European acquisitions. As such, the mix of equity capital is a function 
of the attributes of the capital providers rather than any particular expansion 
Nicholas Stern related the recent experience of the European Bank for Re- 
construction and Development to the discussion. First, Stern observed that the 
apparent motivation for multinational investors in eastern Europe has shifted 
from market share concerns to a more cost-driven agenda. Second, he stressed 
the difference between the actual details of legal systems and the broader com- 
mitment to development that governments can convey to investors. In this vein, 
he wondered whether this commitment can provide a more convincing signal 
to investors than actual legal systems. Finally, Stern noted that 30 percent of 
investment in the eastern parts of  the transition economies was provided by 
Germans while 30 percent of investment in the western parts was provided by 
American investors. He asked whether these trends are a function of different 
risk appetites or sectoral specialization and whether they related to the experi- 
ence of Volkswagen and Thermo Electron. 
Hahn denied the distinction between market share and cost motivations sug- 
gesting that the motivation is always the opportunity provided by a new market. 
Accessing these new markets quickly is the ultimate objective in order not to 
be left behind. He suggested that costs largely even out once up-front costs 
have been amortized. Hahn also noted that total costs rather than labor costs 
are of ultimate importance and wage differentials appear to be falling. Regard- 
ing the relative importance of  legal systems and the commitment to devel- 
opment, Hahn explained that contracts with developing countries will often 
include the actual details of the German Civil Codes in order to protect Volks- 
wagen’s  interests. He also noted that incentives for multinationals include a 
variety of policies from infrastructure provision to generous accounting treat- 
ment to facilitate investment and, finally, a variety of  tax incentives. Finally, 
regarding the preference of  Germans for the eastern parts of  the transition 
economies, Hahn suggested that knowledge of these areas and historic rela- 
tions account for these preferences. Current negotiations in Russia for Volks- 
wagen are being conducted by  Czechs because they are more familiar with 
Russian practices. Additionally, the historic weakness of Europeans in natural 
resource extraction may account for the late entry into Russia relative to U.S. 
firms. 
Hutsopoulos concurred with Hahn on the question of labor cost motivations, 
saying that this had never been a motivation for a Thermo Electron investment. 
He further noted that productivity was of ultimate importance and that U.S. 
productivity, for Thermo Electron’s product lines, is currently unmatched. In 
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fact, he indicated a preference for keeping production within the United States 
and simply using affiliates for their local market knowledge. 
Rene' Stulz turned the discussion to the future of foreign direct investment. 
He proposed that foreign direct investment may become less important as port- 
folio flows increase. As transaction costs come down, such flows provide con- 
siderable diversification benefits to investors without some of  the associated 
inefficiencies, including agency costs, of foreign direct investment. Accord- 
ingly, he suggested that portfolio flows may increasingly substitute for direct 
investment flows. 
Stanley Fischer noted that Hahn's description of multiple sourcing reminded 
him of a description provided by Michael Blumenthal at one of the first prac- 
titioner-academic meetings he attended in the mid- 1980s. At the time, Blumen- 
thal stated that a Burroughs computer purchased in the United States had 
components manufactured in forty-two countries. Hahn's description of Volks- 
wagen sourcing mirrored this very global process. 
Arminio Fraga asked how currency volatility is handled by multinationals 
such as Volkswagen and Thermo Electron. 
Hahn noted that he was expecting substantial improvement in currency sta- 
bility with the advance of the euro and was optimistic about the stability pro- 
vided by  the dual dominance of the dollar and the euro. Hedging is not de- 
signed for asset positions but only trade flows for short periods, and this is not 
universal. More generally, Hahn expressed a preference for seeking balance in 
streams of  merchandise as Volkswagen does with countries such as Spain, 
where there are sizable flows. Finally, Hahn noted that taking large foreign 
exchange positions and freezing exposure at certain levels is always risky. In 
this vein, he noted that the ability of U.S. firms to invoice in dollars represents 
a significant advantage given the built-in hedging opportunities afforded by 
such a strategy. 
HufsopouZos agreed that Thermo Electron does not try to predict exchange 
rate levels and aims instead to match costs and revenues to the greatest degree 
possible. In this vein, the use of debt financing in recent foreign acquisitions 
has facilitated matching to reduce exposure. This Page Intentionally Left Blank